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TYSON FOODS AND THE FUTURE OF 
STATISTICAL ADJUDICATION* 
ROBERT G. BONE** 
Statistical adjudication, the practice of using sampling and other 
statistical techniques to adjudicate large case aggregations, is 
highly controversial today. In all its forms, statistical 
adjudication decides cases on the basis of statistical extrapolation 
rather than case-specific facts. For example, a court adjudicating 
a large class action might try a random sample of cases, average 
the trial verdicts, and give the average to all the other cases in the 
aggregation. In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Supreme 
Court rejected a sampling proposal as inconsistent with the Rules 
Enabling Act, calling it “Trial by Formula.” In the wake of this 
decision, at least one commentator declared the death of 
statistical adjudication. 
In an important decision last term, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. 
Bouaphakeo, the Court changed course and breathed new life 
into statistical adjudication. It upheld the use of sampling to 
establish liability and damages in a Fair Labor Standards Act 
case and indicated that sampling might be available in other 
cases as well. The Court’s opinion is far from clear, however, and 
offers little guidance to lower court judges trying to determine 
when and how to use the procedure in future cases. 
This Article explores the impact of Tyson Foods on the future of 
statistical adjudication. Part I defines statistical adjudication and 
distinguishes it from statistical evidence. Part II shows that Tyson 
Foods is better understood as a case of statistical adjudication 
than simply a case of statistical evidence. Part III takes a closer 
look at the Court’s opinion in an effort to tease out factors and 
principles to guide the future use of statistical adjudication. Part 
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IV explores reasons for the vague discomfort with the procedure, 
reasons that seem tied to nagging doubts about its legitimacy. 
Critics worry that statistical adjudication is too strange a fit with 
adjudication, too substantive to be legitimately implemented as 
procedure, and too mechanical to count as a proper form of 
adjudicative reasoning. Part IV argues that statistical 
adjudication is not as strange as it might seem, that its outcome 
effects do not make it too substantive, and that while it substitutes 
a mechanical decision algorithm for the usual reasoning process, 
it does so in a way that can be justified as legitimate. It is time 
that we recognize statistical adjudication for what it is: a useful 
procedural tool that, when carefully designed and selectively 
deployed, is capable of adjudicating large case aggregations 
fairly and efficiently. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Statistical adjudication, the practice of using sampling and other 
statistical techniques to adjudicate large case aggregations, is highly 
controversial. In all its various forms, statistical adjudication produces 
decisions based not on the facts of the specific case but on statistical 
extrapolations from results in a sample of other cases.1 For example, a 
court adjudicating a large class action might try a random sample of 
cases, average the sample verdicts, and either give the average to all 
the other cases in the aggregation or calculate an aggregate damages 
award for the class based on the average. When properly designed, 
statistical adjudication can produce a reasonably accurate aggregate 
liability figure, reduce the total private and public costs of litigation, 
and sometimes save enough in litigation costs to make plaintiffs 
better off than they would be with individual trials. Notwithstanding 
these benefits, courts have always had serious misgivings about the 
procedure. Only a few federal district courts have used it, and many 
of those courts have been reversed on appeal.2 In its 2011 decision in 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,3 the Supreme Court dismissed a 
proposed sampling procedure with the pejorative label “Trial by 
Formula” and held that it exceeded the limits of the Rules Enabling 
Act (“REA”).4 In the wake of this decision, at least one commentator 
declared the death of statistical adjudication.5 
 
 1. For examples of statistical adjudication, see Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 
767, 782–84 (9th Cir. 1996); Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 653 (E.D. 
Tex. 1990), vacated in part, 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 2. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 
198, 250–62 (E.D.N.Y. 2001), rev’d in part, 344 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom. 
Empire Healthchoice, Inc. v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 393 F.3d 312 (2d Cir. 2004) (per 
curiam); In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1460, 1462 (D. Haw. 
1995), aff’d sub nom. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996); Cimino, 751 
F. Supp. at 653; Jay Tidmarsh, Resurrecting Trial by Statistics, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1459, 1461 
n.10 (2015) (reviewing cases in which sampling procedures have been rejected as well as 
cases that show unease about the use of sampling). 
 3. 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
 4. See id. at 367. 
 5. Tidmarsh, supra note 2, at 1459 (noting that after Wal-Mart “[t]he notion that a 
court could try a representative sample of monetary claims and extrapolate the average 
result to the remainder of the cases was finished”). For other discussions of statistical 
adjudication published after Wal-Mart, see Hillel J. Bavli, Aggregating for Accuracy: A 
Closer Look at Sampling and Accuracy in Class Action Litigation, 14 LAW, PROBABILITY 
& RISK 67, 82–83 (2015); Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for “Trial by Formula,” 90 TEX. 
L. REV. 571, 577–79 (2012). See generally Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Sampling 
Damages, 83 IOWA L. REV. 545 (1998) [hereinafter Walker & Monahan, Sampling 
Damages] (arguing that the use of random sampling for damages can facilitate mass tort 
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This death notice was premature. In an important decision last 
term, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo,6 the Supreme Court changed 
course and breathed new life into statistical adjudication. But the 
Court’s opinion is far from clear. It treats the case as one involving 
statistical evidence and employee-specific inferences when it actually 
involves substituting statistical averages for employee-specific fact 
finding. This makes it more like a case of statistical adjudication than 
a case of statistical evidence. Moreover, while the Court contemplates 
the use of statistical adjudication more broadly, its opinion offers little 
explicit guidance to lower court judges who must determine when and 
how to use the procedure in future cases. 
Thus, while statistical adjudication is alive, its prognosis is 
uncertain. But why? Why the discomfort with using statistical 
techniques to extrapolate from sample results to outcomes in related 
cases? The concern seems to be about more than just the overall 
balance of social costs and benefits or the impact on participation and 
substantive rights. When objections are framed in legal terms, they 
often invoke institutional limits on what courts can properly do. But 
what are those limits? And why does a seemingly sensible procedure 
for fairly and efficiently resolving large aggregations of related cases 
exceed those limits? 
This Article explores the impact of Tyson Foods on the future of 
statistical adjudication. It builds on my earlier work analyzing the 
costs and benefits of statistical adjudication and extends that work by 
developing its implications in light of the Tyson Foods decision.7 The 
Article has two main goals. First, it seeks to fill the gap that the Tyson 
Foods Court left open and develop a sensible set of principles and 
factors to guide future use of statistical adjudication. Second, it 
probes the reasons for general discomfort with the procedure. Unless 
that discomfort is diagnosed and critically examined, statistical 
adjudication is unlikely to fare well, even in those cases where it 
otherwise makes sense on policy grounds. 
The body of this Article is divided into four parts. Part I defines 
statistical adjudication and distinguishes it from statistical evidence. 
 
litigation); Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Essay, Sampling Liability, 85 VA. L. REV. 
329 (1999) (arguing that sampling for liability makes sense in a range of cases). 
 6. 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016). 
 7. For this earlier work, see Robert G. Bone, A Normative Evaluation of Actuarial 
Litigation, 18 CONN. INS. L.J. 227, 231–33 (2011) [hereinafter Bone, Actuarial Litigation]; 
Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a World of Process 
Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REV. 561, 566–69 (1993) [hereinafter Bone, Statistical Adjudication]. 
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Part II provides background on Tyson Foods and examines the 
Court’s opinion with care. It shows that Tyson Foods is better 
understood as a case of statistical adjudication than a case involving 
only statistical evidence. It also highlights an important aspect of the 
decision: the Court extends statistical adjudication beyond estimating 
damages to determining liability as well. 
Part III argues that Tyson Foods, when properly understood, 
authorizes statistical adjudication well beyond the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (“FLSA”) claim at issue in the case. Part III also 
develops a set of principles and factors to guide future use of the 
procedure. It does so by carefully examining what the Court says and 
does in light of the broader purposes of civil adjudication and the 
impact of sampling on outcome quality and participation rights. 
Part IV explores reasons for the vague discomfort with statistical 
adjudication. This discomfort, I believe, is tied to nagging doubts 
about the legitimacy of the procedure. Critics worry that statistical 
adjudication is too strange a fit with adjudication, too substantive to 
be properly implemented as procedure, and too mechanical to count 
as a legitimate form of adjudicative reasoning. Part IV addresses each 
of these concerns in turn. It argues that statistical adjudication is not 
as strange as it might seem, that its outcome effects do not make it too 
substantive, and that while it substitutes a mechanical decision 
algorithm for the usual process of judicial reasoning, it does so in a 
way that can be justified as legitimate. 
I.  STATISTICAL ADJUDICATION DEFINED 
There are many uses for statistics in civil adjudication.8 The 
substantive law sometimes explicitly incorporates a probabilistic 
element that invites statistical proof, such as the “likelihood of 
confusion” test for liability in trademark law.9 Sometimes the law 
includes an element that is best evaluated statistically. For example, 
in a Title VII disparate impact claim, the differential effects of the 
defendant’s employment practices must be measured in statistical 
 
 8. For some examples, see Joseph B. Kadane, Probability Sampling in Litigation, 18 
CONN. INS. L.J. 297, 299–303 (2011). 
 9. See 15 U.S.C. §	1125(a)(1)(A) (2012). Liability for trademark infringement 
depends on whether the defendant’s use of a mark is likely to cause consumer confusion, 
and sampling consumer reaction is a common way to prove the requisite likelihood. See 4 
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§§	23:1, 23:2.50 (4th ed. 2016).  
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terms.10 And sometimes the law points to counterfactual propositions 
that can only be proved by statistical methods. For example, statistical 
modeling is used in antitrust suits to determine damages when it is 
impossible to know directly what the counterfactual market free from 
the antitrust violation would have looked like.11 
In all these examples, the substantive issue itself is statistical or 
makes sense only in statistical terms. As a result, statistical evidence is 
the obvious—and often the only—way to prove the issue and 
generate a reasonably correct substantive result for each individual 
case. In a trademark suit, for example, likelihood of consumer 
confusion is statistical by definition, and statistical sampling of 
prospective consumers is the best way to determine it. Moreover, 
disparate impact in a Title VII suit is essentially a statistical concept 
calling for statistical proof. And in an antitrust suit, when the 
substantive law requires proof of a counterfactual scenario for which 
there can be no direct evidence, statistical modeling is an obvious way 
to proceed.  
Statistical adjudication is different. It employs aggregate statistics 
to decide issues that are not intrinsically statistical and for which, in 
theory, there could be nonstatistical, case-specific evidence. Thus, 
statistical adjudication does not focus on the individual case or try to 
generate a correct substantive result for each case based on case-
specific facts. Instead, it treats each case as an average case and 
substitutes the sample average (or other statistic) for a case-specific 
result based on individualized fact-finding.12 For example, when a 
judge adjudicates a large aggregation of cases by taking a random 
sample and averaging the sample case verdicts, the judge does not use 
the sample average as evidence from which to infer specific causation, 
contributory fault, damages, and the like for each individual case. 
That would be using the sample average as statistical evidence. 
Rather, the judge applies the sample average in place of individual 
facts and generates an average outcome for each plaintiff or an 
aggregate award for the class as a whole. 
 
 10. See GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: VISIONS OF 
EQUALITY IN THEORY AND DOCTRINE 79–89 (3d ed. 2010). 
 11. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 116 & n.11 
(1969) (allowing the computation of antitrust damages based on a counterfactual 
calculation that plaintiffs would have enjoyed 16% market share as opposed to their actual 
3.2% share). 
 12. For more background on statistical adjudication, see generally Bone, Statistical 
Adjudication, supra note 7.  
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There are other ways to implement statistical adjudication. One 
can, for example, use the sample average as a presumption that shifts 
the burden to the defendant when the defendant has no evidence to 
offer in rebuttal. Indeed, in Tyson Foods, as we shall see, the Court 
assumed that the defendant could not rebut the presumption and, 
therefore, that the sample average controlled the outcome for all class 
members just as though the presumption had been conclusive.13 
A particularly important feature distinguishing statistical 
adjudication from statistical evidence has to do with the reason why 
the sample average is allowed to affect or control outcomes. For 
statistical evidence, that reason is to achieve the best possible jury or 
judge determination of the relevant issue based on the facts of an 
individual case. Since the aim is to get as close to the right decision as 
possible, the focus is on the probative value of the sample average 
compared to other available evidence.  
The focus of statistical adjudication is different. The primary 
reason to use the sample average in statistical adjudication is not to 
get the right result on the facts of each individual case. Instead, it is to 
get a good enough result for all cases so that the substantive law 
achieves its deterrence goals and litigants are treated fairly and justly 
in relation to one another. As we shall see, the use of the sample 
average in Tyson Foods overcomes proof problems caused by the 
defendant’s failure to keep adequate records and does so in a way 
that supports collective adjudication of the small claims involved and 
enables private enforcement of the FLSA.14 
The distinction between statistical adjudication and statistical 
evidence is not always perfectly clear or precise. For example, an 
evidentiary presumption designed to force disclosure of information 
aids in enforcing the substantive law. Thus, one might use a sample 
average to support a presumption that shifts the burden to the 
defendant to force the defendant to disclose private information. This 
would be use as statistical evidence if the defendant is likely to have 
the information and its disclosure would improve decisional accuracy 
on the facts of the individual case. In Tyson Foods, however, the focus 
is not on ferreting out private information or getting as close as 
possible to an accurate estimate of overtime in each individual case. 
Instead, the focus is on generating a rough average estimate of 
 
 13. See infra notes 58–60, 87–88 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra Section III.A.1. 
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overtime for all employees in order to overcome impediments to suit 
and optimally serve the policies of the substantive law.15 
Stated simply, it is one thing to use the sample average because 
the best interpretation of the substantive law authorizes its use and it 
has probative value, or even because it supports a presumption that is 
designed to ferret out case-specific evidence relevant to deciding an 
individual issue when there is a reasonable expectation that the 
defendant has evidence to offer (so most cases will be decided in the 
ordinary way). It is quite a different thing to use the sample average, 
when the substantive law requires an individualized determination, on 
the ground that there are case-specific procedural or evidentiary 
problems with generating an individualized decision and enabling 
enforcement of the substantive law. The former is use as statistical 
evidence; the latter is use for statistical adjudication. 
No matter what form it takes, statistical adjudication involves 
sampling. There are different ways to sample cases from an 
aggregation. One might draw a single sample or one might divide the 
aggregation into subgroups and sample each subgroup separately.16 
The latter approach, known as stratified sampling, is more costly, but 
it is also useful in coping with greater population heterogeneity.17 
The simplest way to employ statistical adjudication is to try a 
random sample of cases and average the sample results.18 To 
illustrate, suppose there are 100 aggregated cases. Rather than try 
each case individually, the judge randomly samples ten cases and tries 
each sampled case to a jury. Suppose that the jury finds for the 
defendant in two of the ten cases, and with respect to the other eight, 
it returns a verdict of $100,000 in two of those eight cases, $500,000 in 
four, and $1 million in two. The average of the sample results is 
 
 15. See infra Section II.B. 
 16. For example, the trial judge in Cimino v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 751 F. Supp. 
649 (E.D. Tex. 1990), vacated in part, 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998), used a stratified sample, 
dividing the asbestos class into five disease categories and sampling from each separately. 
See id. at 653. 
 17. It is also possible, in theory at least, to construct a linear regression equation from 
the sample results and use it to generate outcomes that vary with different case 
characteristics. See Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 7, at 584–87. Properly done, 
linear regression can produce results that are even more closely tailored to the particular 
facts of individual cases, but it is even more costly to implement than stratified sampling. 
 18. The trial judge in the Cimino case proceeded in this way although he let the 
plaintiffs in the sampled cases keep their actual verdicts and gave the average to all the 
other plaintiffs in the aggregation. Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 653. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 607 (2017) 
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[(2	×	0)	+	(2	×	100,000)	+	(4	×	500,000)	+	(2	×	1,000,000)]	÷	10	=	$420,000.19 
The court then enters a judgment for an aggregate award of 
100	×	420,000	=	$42,000,000—or gives each plaintiff an average award 
of $420,000.20 
In a variant on this approach, instead of trying each case in the 
sample, the judge appoints a special master to survey and depose the 
sampled plaintiffs.21 Based on the results of these surveys and 
depositions, the special master recommends average damages for the 
population as a whole or average damages for each subgroup of a 
stratified sample.22 The judge submits these averages to a jury, along 
with expert testimony about the statistical reliability of the sampling 
procedure and perhaps some testimony from the sampled plaintiffs.23 
The jury decides whether to accept, modify, or reject the sample 
average and then returns an aggregate verdict.24 
It is important to bear in mind that even when a jury alters the 
sample results, it does not do so in order to determine the facts of 
each individual case. The reason the jury hears evidence beyond the 
sampling study is to evaluate the reliability of the methodology and 
possibly make adjustments to account for overall characteristics of the 
aggregation. The jury cannot find individual case-specific facts 
because it has no evidence for individual cases beyond those in the 
sample, and as we shall see, it cannot draw reliable case-specific 
inferences unless the aggregation is unusually homogeneous.25 
In these examples, statistical adjudication is used to determine 
both liability and damages. However, it is also possible to prove 
liability in the usual case-specific way and use sampling only to 
 
 19. There is another way to do this that yields the same result. First, note that two 
verdicts for the defendant implies a 20% invalidity rate for the entire population of cases. 
So, one might first apply the 20% invalidity rate to yield eighty cases in which plaintiffs 
should receive verdicts. Focusing on just the eight sample cases with plaintiff verdicts, the 
average is [(2	×	100,000)	+	(4	×	500,000)	+	(2	×	1,000,000)]	÷	8	=	$525,000. As a result, each 
plaintiff receives 525,000	–	(0.2	×	525,000)	=	$420,000. This is the method the special master 
in Hilao appears to have used. See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 782–84 (9th 
Cir. 1996). 
 20. Or it might give the sampled cases their own individual awards and the rest of the 
cases the sample average. 
 21. The method described in this paragraph is roughly the method used in Hilao, 103 
F.3d at 782–84, and also the method proposed by the Ninth Circuit for determining 
backpay awards in Dukes, see Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 627 (9th Cir. 
2010), rev’d, 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
 22. See Hilao, 103 F.3d at 783. 
 23. See id. at 784. 
 24. See id. 
 25. See infra text accompanying notes 158–60.  
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measure damages.26 In addition, statistical adjudication can be used to 
decide only particular issues. As we shall see, the court in Tyson 
Foods used statistical adjudication to determine a key factual issue 
critical to both liability and damages—the time taken to don and doff 
specialized equipment—and it did so by admitting into evidence a 
sampling study and allowing the jury to modify the sample average.27 
Finally, judges dealing with large aggregations sometimes select a 
sample of cases for so-called “bellwether trials.”28 The purpose of 
holding bellwether trials is to facilitate settlement by generating a 
common baseline of trial verdicts to help estimate a settlement value 
for the aggregation.29 Although the bellwether trial procedure 
involves sampling, it is distinct from statistical adjudication. The goal 
of bellwether trials is to facilitate settlement; the goal of statistical 
adjudication is to render a final judgment binding on all cases in the 
aggregation. 
A point of clarification is in order before proceeding. This 
Article frequently refers to “sampling” without also mentioning 
statistical adjudication. Virtually all of these references assume 
sampling is being used as part of a statistical adjudication procedure. 
Where this is not the case, it will be clear from the context. 
II.  TYSON FOODS: A CRITICAL SUMMARY 
A. The Background Facts 
Tyson Foods was a wages-and-hours case brought by employees 
of Tyson Foods, Inc.’s pork processing plant in Storm Lake, Iowa.30 
The lawsuit, filed in the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Iowa, alleged claims under the FLSA and the Iowa Wage 
Payment Collection Law (“IWPCL”) to recover damages for 
 
 26. See Walker & Monahan, Sampling Damages, supra note 5, at 549, 561–65.  
 27. See infra Section II.A. 
 28. See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 574 F. Supp. 2d 606, 608 (E.D. La. 2008); Eldon 
E. Fallon, Jeremy T. Grabill & Robert Pitard Wynne, Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict 
Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2323, 2326–29 (2008); Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 
76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 576, 577–78 (2008) (analyzing the merits of bellwether trials). 
 29. Lahav, supra note 28, at 577–78. 
 30. See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1042 (2016). For an 
interesting discussion of the parties’ litigation strategy choices and their impact, see 
generally Andrew J. Trask, Litigation Matters: The Curious Case of Tyson Foods v. 
Bouaphakeo, 2016 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 279.  
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uncompensated overtime pay.31 The plaintiffs sought to represent 
other similarly situated employees under a FLSA collective action for 
the FLSA claims and under a Rule 23(b)(3) class action for the 
IWPCL claims.32 
The dispute arose out of Tyson’s method of compensating 
employees in the kill, cut, and retrim departments at the plant.33 The 
work involves slaughtering and preparing meat for market, which 
requires the use of knives and other sharp implements, and as a 
result, employees wear protective gear to safeguard against injury.34 
The issue in the case had to do with Tyson’s responsibility to pay for 
the time employees spent donning and doffing their protective gear.35 
Tyson’s so-called “gang-time” system compensates employees 
for the time they actually spend at their workstations but not for time 
spent donning and doffing.36 In 1998, Tyson began compensating for 
donning and doffing time, but rather than keep track of the minutes 
for each employee, the company used an average figure of four 
minutes per day, which it called “K-code” time.37 K-code time was 
changed in 2007 so that only some employees received it, and those 
who did were credited with between four and eight minutes, 
depending on their equipment.38 Thus, throughout the period covered 
by the lawsuit, Tyson paid all employees for gang-time and some 
employees for gang-time plus K-code time. 
The plaintiffs alleged that for many Storm Lake employees the 
time spent donning and doffing protective equipment exceeded the 
K-code time and that, as a result, their actual compensable working 
 
 31. Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1042. The Court makes clear that the IWPCL claim 
targets the same allegedly wrongful conduct as the FLSA claim. Id. (“This statute provides 
for recovery under state law when an employer fails to pay its employees ‘all wages due,’ 
which includes FLSA-mandated overtime” (quoting IOWA CODE ANN. §	91A.3 (West, 
Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.))).  
 32. See id. The FLSA collective action is created by the FLSA statute, see 29 U.S.C. 
§	216 (2012), whereas the Rule 23(b)(3) class action is created by the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). The FLSA collective action is an opt-in 
procedure; employees must affirmatively elect to join the action in order to benefit from it 
and be bound by it. See Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1530 (2013). 
The Rule 23(b)(3) class action, by contrast, is an opt-out procedure; class members must 
affirmatively choose to exit the class if they wish not to be bound by the result. See FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v). 
 33. See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1042. 
 34. See id. 
 35. Id. at 1041. 
 36. Id. at 1042. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
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time exceeded forty hours per week, entitling them to overtime pay.39 
Because Tyson kept no records of donning and doffing times, the 
plaintiffs had no basis for calculating individual overtime.40 They 
relied instead on two studies: a statistical study by Dr. Kenneth 
Mericle that estimated average donning and doffing time for a sample 
of employees and a study by Dr. Liesl Fox that used the results of the 
Mericle study to calculate the overtime pay owed by Tyson.41  
The Mericle study employed a statistical sampling procedure to 
estimate average donning and doffing times. The Court describes the 
study as follows:  
[The] evidence included employee testimony, video recordings 
of donning and doffing at the plant, and, most important, a 
study performed by an industrial relations expert, Dr. Kenneth 
Mericle. Mericle conducted 744 videotaped observations and 
analyzed how long various donning and doffing activities took. 
He then averaged the time taken in the observations to produce 
an estimate of 18 minutes a day for the cut and retrim 
departments and 21.25 minutes for the kill department.42 
Mericle’s averages were then used in the Fox study and 
combined with Tyson’s records of gang-time and K-code time to 
determine which employees worked overtime and how much 
uncompensated overtime they were due.43 Fox estimated the total 
amount of uncompensated overtime at $6.7 million for all employees 
in the aggregate.44 He did this by adding Mericle’s average donning 
and doffing time to Tyson’s record of gang-time for each employee, 
subtracting any K-code time, and then summing up the results over all 
the employees.45 The Supreme Court gave two helpful examples to 
illustrate the methodology: 
For example, if an employee in the kill department had worked 
39.125 hours of gang-time in a 6-day workweek and had been 
paid an hour of K-code time, the estimated number of 
 
 39. See id. 
 40. Id. at 1043. 
 41. See id. at 1043–44. Other FLSA cases decided before Tyson Foods relied on 
similar studies. See, e.g., Perez v. Mountaire Farms, Inc., 650 F.3d 350, 362 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(describing expert time studies used to measure the average donning and doffing time in a 
poultry processing plant). 
 42. Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1043. 
 43. Id. at 1043–44. 
 44. Id. at 1044. 
 45. Id. at 1043–44. 
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compensable hours the employee worked would be: 39.125 
(individual number of gang-time hours worked)	+	2.125 (the 
average donning and doffing hours for a 6-day week, based on 
Mericle’s estimated average of 21.25 minutes a day)	–	1 (K-code 
hours)	=	40.25. That would mean the employee was being 
undercompensated by a quarter of an hour of overtime a week, 
in violation of the FLSA. On the other hand, if the employee’s 
records showed only 38 hours of gang-time and an hour of K-
code time, the calculation would be: 38	+	2.125	–	1	=	39.125. 
Having worked less than 40 hours, that employee would not be 
entitled to overtime pay and would not have proved an FLSA 
violation.46 
The key thing to note about these estimates is that they are all 
based on average donning and doffing times and not on actual times 
for each employee. If all employees took identical time to don and 
doff, average time would be the same as actual time. But the evidence 
made clear that employees took different times, and those 
differences, though small, significantly affected Tyson’s liability to 
individual employees.47 If an employee did not work overtime—and a 
few minutes per day compiled over a week of work determined that 
fact—Tyson was not liable to that employee.48 These points may seem 
obvious, but it is important to keep them clearly in mind as we 
unpack the Court’s opinion. 
The district court certified a collective action for the FLSA 
claims and a Rule 23(b)(3) class action for the IWPCL claims.49 The 
case went to trial. In addition to submitting the Mericle and Fox 
studies, the plaintiffs also introduced evidence to prove Tyson’s plant-
wide compensation policies and practices, called a number of 
employees as witnesses to testify to the nature of the equipment and 
their own donning and doffing times, and submitted video recordings 
of donning and doffing activity.50 The jury found Tyson liable and 
 
 46. Id. at 1044. 
 47. See id. at 1055 (Thomas, J., dissenting); infra notes 80–81 and accompanying text. 
 48. See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1043 (“Since the employees’ claims relate only to 
overtime, each employee had to show he or she worked more than 40 hours a week, 
inclusive of time spent donning and doffing, in order to recover.”). 
 49. Id. A total of 444 employees opted into the FLSA collective action, and a total of 
3,344 employees remained in the IWPCL class at the close of the opt-out period. Tyson 
Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1043. 
 50. See Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 5:07-CV-04009, 2012 WL 4471119, at *3 
(N.D. Iowa Sept. 26, 2012) (noting that some employees “testified to the[ir] general 
practices	.	.	.	regarding the donning and doffing of [personal protective equipment 
(“PPE”)]” including “which PPE items were used by different groups of 
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returned a verdict in the aggregate amount of roughly $2.9 million.51 
Tyson moved to set aside the verdict, arguing, in part, that neither the 
FLSA collective action nor the Rule 23 class action was properly 
certified.52 The district court denied Tyson’s motion, and the Eighth 
Circuit affirmed.53 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and 
affirmed by a six-to-two margin. 
B. The Court’s Holding 
The Supreme Court addressed two issues: (1) whether there was 
sufficient commonality among the claims to support certification of a 
class action and a collective action, and (2) whether it was permissible 
to distribute an aggregate damages award to the class when some 
class members suffered no legal injury.54 
As to the first issue, Tyson argued that donning and doffing times 
varied too much across departments and across employees in the 
same department to satisfy the FLSA’s “similarly situated” 
requirement and Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement.55 
Furthermore, to establish liability, each employee had to prove that 
he or she worked overtime and was not properly compensated for it.56 
Tyson insisted that these were individual questions that varied from 
employee to employee—some employees worked overtime and 
others did not, and those who worked overtime did so for different 
periods of time.57 
 
employees	.	.	.	how often people donned and doffed these items, how these items were 
stored, cleaned, and sanitized, and how long it generally took for people to don and doff 
the items[,]” and “[w]itnesses also testified that Plaintiffs spent more time donning and 
doffing their PPE than Defendant paid them in K-code time”), aff’d, 765 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 
2014), aff’d and remanded, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016). 
 51. Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1044. Tyson requested a single trial of liability and 
damages and an aggregate verdict, rather than a bifurcated proceeding and individual 
damage verdicts for each employee. Id. However, Tyson’s choice makes no difference to 
the statistical adjudication issue. Mericle’s average figures would still have to be used 
whether damages were individualized or aggregated. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See id. at 1041. 
 55. Id. at 1046. Section 216 of the FLSA requires that all employees in a collective 
action be “similarly situated[,]” 29 U.S.C. §	216 (2012), and Rule 23(b)(3) requires that 
common questions “predominate” over individual questions, FED R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 56. See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1046 (“To be entitled to recovery	.	.	.	each employee 
must prove that the amount of time spent donning and doffing, when added to his or her 
regular hours, amounted to more than 40 hours in a given week. Petitioner argues that 
these necessarily person-specific inquiries into individual work time predominate over the 
common questions raised by respondents’ claims, making class certification improper.”). 
 57. Id. at 1041. 
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The Court, however, held that a jury could rely on Mericle’s 
sample averages to determine how many employees worked overtime 
and how much overtime they worked.58 More precisely, the Court 
held that the sample average supported a rebuttable presumption of 
each employee’s actual time.59 Since Tyson did not keep records, it 
had no evidence to rebut the presumption on an individualized basis, 
so its “primary defense was to show that Mericle’s study was 
unrepresentative or inaccurate.”60 For this reason, what had been 
individual questions about employee work time became common 
questions about the adequacy of the Mericle study. As a result, both 
the predominance and similarly situated requirements were satisfied, 
and the Court affirmed certification of both the class action and the 
collective action.61 
The second issue arose because the class included employees 
who never worked overtime and thus had no legal claims. Tyson 
argued that it was improper to distribute shares of the aggregate 
damage award to those uninjured employees and that since it was 
impossible to identify uninjured employees in order to separate them 
out, the suit could not proceed as a class action.62 The Court rejected 
this argument as premature.63 It held that the district judge should 
first be given a chance to see if a distribution method could be devised 
that excludes the uninjured employees.64 
 
 58. See id. at 1047. 
 59. See id. (citing Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 685, 687–88 
(1946), superseded by statute, Act of May 14, 1947, ch. 52, sec. 4, 61 Stat. 84, 86–87 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §	254(a) (2012))). 
 60. Id. 
 61. See id. at 1045–49. In fact, the Court assumed that a FLSA collective action would 
be permissible if a Rule 23 class action were permissible and therefore focused exclusively 
on Rule 23 requirements. See id. at 1045. There were other common questions in the case, 
such as whether donning and doffing activities were compensable work under the FLSA 
and whether the time was excluded under the FLSA’s de minimis exception, but the Court 
did not rely on these questions alone to satisfy predominance. See id. at 1043, 1045–49. 
 62. Brief of Petitioner at 51–52, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036 
(2016) (No. 14-1146). Tyson had originally argued that a class action was proper only if the 
plaintiffs could prove that the class included only members who actually suffered legal 
injury. Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1049 (citing Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Tyson 
Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 135 S. Ct. 2806 (2015) (No. 14-1146)). But it abandoned that 
argument in favor of a narrower one questioning the distribution of the aggregate award. 
See id. (citing Brief for Petitioner, supra, at 49). 
 63. Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1050. 
 64. Id. The Court mentioned a possible approach, which, like its liability analysis, 
assumed that the jury actually found that all employees took an identical time to don and 
doff: 
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C. The Court’s Reasoning 
One of the most striking aspects of the opinion is how 
challenging the Court found it to justify the sample average. This is 
especially surprising because the case seems a particularly strong one 
for statistical adjudication. Tyson employees were unable to prove 
their individual overtime with direct evidence because Tyson kept no 
records of actual donning and doffing times.65 Moreover, most, if not 
all, employees had too little at stake to justify the cost of an individual 
suit, so a class or collective action was necessary to vindicate the 
substantive rights at stake.66 And the requirements for certifying a 
class or collective action could be satisfied only with a collective 
method of determining liability and damages, which statistical 
sampling supplied.67 As for Tyson, its substantive liability would be 
about the same with sampling as without. As long as the sampling 
procedure was properly designed—and Tyson raised no objections to 
its design68—aggregate damages based on the sample average would 
closely approximate total damages based on individual trials.69 
The following discussion critically reviews the Court’s reasoning. 
In what is perhaps the most important step of its argument, the Court 
characterizes the case as one involving statistical evidence and a jury 
inference from sampling results, rather than statistical adjudication 
 
[B]y working backwards from the damages award, and assuming each employee 
donned and doffed for an identical amount of time (an assumption that follows 
from the jury’s finding that the employees suffered equivalent harm under the 
policy), it may be possible to calculate the average donning and doffing time the 
jury necessarily must have found, and then apply this figure to each employee’s 
known gang-time hours to determine which employees worked more than 40 
hours. 
Id. 
 65. Id. at 1042. And, of course, neither did the employees. 
 66. Apparently, employees incurred “overtime damages ranging from a few cents to 
several thousand dollars,” and 509 workers suffered injuries ranging from twenty-seven 
cents to less than $100. See Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 765 F.3d 791, 804 (8th Cir. 
2014), aff’d and remanded, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016). This level of recovery is generally 
inadequate to support individual litigation. See Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 705 
F.3d 770, 776 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting in a FLSA case that losses of “several thousand 
dollars” are not “enough to finance a modern federal lawsuit”). 
 67. See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1047. 
 68. Id. at 1044. 
 69. This result follows from the statistical property that the sample average is close to 
the population average for a large enough sample. For a discussion of this and other 
statistical properties of the sample average, see RICHARD J. LARSEN & MORRIS L. MARX, 
AN INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS §	3.9, at 
162–73 (2d ed. 1986). 
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and the application of the sample average directly. Having 
characterized the case in this way, the Court then justifies the use of 
the inference to determine liability as well as damages. Finally, the 
Court removes the Wal-Mart barrier to sampling by reinterpreting 
Wal-Mart’s “Trial by Formula” holding.70 
1.  Evidentiary Inference or Statistical Adjudication? 
The Court treats the sample averages generated by Mericle’s 
study as so-called “representative evidence” from which a jury could 
infer the factual findings necessary to decide each employee’s 
separate case.71 In Tyson Foods, each employee’s FLSA right was an 
individual right, and Tyson’s liability was owed to each employee 
individually, not to all employees as a group. In keeping with this 
individualized focus, the Court framed the “central dispute in the 
case” as whether the jury could properly infer that “each employee 
donned and doffed for the same average time observed in Mericle’s 
sample.”72 
This is an odd way to frame the issue. It was not possible on the 
facts for a reasonable jury to infer that each employee took the same 
time to don and doff. Such an inference defies common sense given 
the obvious differences among employees, and the evidence in the 
case indicates otherwise.73 Even employees who actually testified at 
trial described different donning and doffing times.74 At one point, 
 
 70. See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1048. 
 71. See id. at 1046. The phrase “representative evidence” and its close cousin 
“representative testimony” are standard in FLSA litigation used to refer to the practice of 
relying on evidence from some employees to support findings for all employees. See, e.g., 
Reich v. S. New Eng. Telecomms. Corp., 121 F.3d 58, 66–68 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(“representative testimony” in a FLSA action brought by the secretary of labor); Indergit 
v. Rite Aid Corp., 52 F. Supp. 3d 522, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“representative testimony” in 
a private FLSA action); LaFleur v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 3d 463, 473–75 
(E.D. Va. 2014) (referring to evidence from a sample of employees as “representative 
testimony” and noting that “[t]estimony of a representative sampling of plaintiffs in a 
collective action is a procedure often used in FLSA actions”); Falcon v. Starbucks Corp., 
580 F. Supp. 2d 528, 540 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (noting that plaintiffs can use “representative 
testimony” in a FLSA case). 
 72. Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1046. The Court assumes throughout the opinion that 
the jury found identical times. See id. at 1050. 
 73. Id. at 1055 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that “cut and retrim employees took 
between 0.583 minutes and over 10 minutes to don preshift equipment” and “[n]o two 
employees performed the same activity in the same amount of time”). 
 74. Id. at 1057 (“For instance, Mericle’s study estimated that kill department 
employees took an average 6.4 minutes to don equipment at their lockers before their 
shift—but employee Donald Brown testified that this activity took him around 2 minutes. 
Others also testified to donning and doffing times that diverged markedly from Mericle’s 
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the Court hedges a bit by referring to “roughly equal time[s].”75 But 
roughly equal is not the same as identical. 
This is important because it means that the only thing the jury 
could have done is use the sample average itself as the time for each 
and every individual employee.76 This strongly suggests that the case 
is more like one involving statistical adjudication than one involving 
statistical evidence. If the sample average functioned only as 
statistical evidence, the jury would have had no reason to rely on it 
for cases where there was individual evidence, as there was for some 
of the sampled employees in the Mericle study.77 Moreover, as 
explained further below, if the goal had been to use the available 
evidence to get as accurate a decision as practically feasible in each 
individual case, it would have made sense for the Court to require 
each employee to submit her own average time based on a Mericle-
type study of her personal donning and doffing activity.78 Although 
these individualized averages might differ somewhat from the actual 
historical times, they should be more accurate for individual cases 
than a population-wide sample average. However, if the Court had 
required individualized averages, donning and doffing time would 
have been an individual issue, threatening Rule 23(b)(3) 
predominance and class action treatment.79 
I am not suggesting that a jury could never rely on a sample 
average to infer facts about individual employees. Had Tyson’s 
liability turned on what was an objectively “reasonable” time to don 
and doff, then the sample average might have been justified as 
statistical evidence probative of an objectively “reasonable” time. But 
the Court treats the sample average as probative of actual time, not 
 
estimates.”); see also Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 5:07-CV-04009-JAJ, 2011 WL 
3421541, at *5 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 4, 2011). 
 75. See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1049 (majority opinion). 
 76. Or the jury could have used a modified version of the sample average. In fact, the 
jury awarded less than half the total damages that Fox calculated using the sample 
average. Id. at 1044. This means that the jury must have modified the result in some way 
or discounted some of the claims (or just felt that the actual damages were too high). 
Unfortunately, there is no way to determine exactly what the jury did. See id. at 1052 
(Roberts, C.J., concurring) (speculating on what the jury might have done). 
 77. See id. at 1055 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting the wide variation in the times 
taken by the sampled employees observed by Mericle). 
 78. See infra notes 135–36 and accompanying text. 
 79. In effect, the Court assumes that the jury decided in two steps: that it first inferred 
actual time for an employee (call her X) from Mericle’s averages and then determined 
liability and damages for X based on X’s actual time. However, the jury could only have 
decided in one step: it must have determined liability and calculated damages for X 
directly on the basis of Mericle’s average without inferring anything about her actual time. 
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reasonable time. Also, an inference from the sample average to actual 
times might be acceptable if there were other evidence in the case 
suggesting that employees took identical times. But Mericle’s 
observations, the video evidence, and the trial testimony all showed 
that Tyson employees took different times.80 To be sure, the 
differences are quite small—measured in minutes per day—but those 
minutes make a substantial difference to Tyson’s liability as well as to 
the damages it owed individual employees.81 
In addition, the sample average might have evidentiary value if it 
supplemented individualized evidence of employee-specific times in 
some probative way. But this is not how the Tyson Foods Court uses 
it. The Court instead holds that the sample average itself can support 
a factual determination of individual donning and doffing time.82 This 
holding is far from obvious. Courts and commentators have long 
struggled with the propriety of using aggregate statistics and base rate 
probabilities to prove individualized liability elements in the absence 
of more particularized, case-specific evidence—at least when the 
substantive law does not clearly invite a statistical approach.83 Indeed, 
 
 80. See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1055. For a case that refused to allow testimony 
from a sample of employees to establish overtime compensation and minimum wage 
violations for other employees in part because employee-specific facts varied too much, 
see Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 705 F.3d 770, 774–75 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 81. Indeed, slight deviations in the sample average had a substantial impact on the 
number of employees with valid overtime claims, indicating that small differences in 
donning and doffing times were significant. See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1055 (“If 
Mericle’s averages even slightly overestimated average donning and doffing times, another 
282 class members would have no overtime claims. If average donning or doffing times 
dropped from 18–21 minutes to 15 minutes, Fox stated, another 110 employees had no 
overtime claims.”). 
 82. See id. at 1046–47 (majority opinion) (noting that because employees could use 
the sample average to prove their times in individual suits, “that sample is a permissible 
means of establishing the employees’ hours worked in a class action”). Indeed, if each 
plaintiff had to supplement the sample average with individual evidence of donning and 
doffing activity, it would have been very difficult for named plaintiffs to satisfy Rule 
23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement. The sufficiency of the sample average ensured that 
individual donning and doffing times could be proved on a class-wide basis and thus 
facilitated a predominance finding. See supra text accompanying notes 55–61.  
 83. See Howard v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 160 F.3d 358, 359–60 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(discussing some of the problems with relying exclusively on a base rate statistic to prove 
an individual element, at least when it would be reasonable to expect case-specific 
evidence); Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc., 58 N.E.2d 754, 755 (Mass. 1945) (rejecting the 
sufficiency of the statistical evidence offered to identify the owner of a bus that caused an 
accident); Glen O. Robinson & Kenneth S. Abraham, Essay, Collective Justice in Tort 
Law, 78 VA. L. REV. 1481, 1486–87 (1992) (criticizing tort law’s individual, case-specific 
focus and noting in particular “the traditional hostility of courts to statistical and 
probabilistic evidence, which is aggregative in character, in favor of individual, ‘clinical’-
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the Tyson Foods Court itself recognized that the evidentiary 
sufficiency of the sample average requires special justification. For 
that purpose, the Court relied on the fact that Tyson failed to keep 
records of individual times as required by the FLSA, that its failure 
deprived employees of the ability to prove their actual times 
precisely, and that allowing use of the sample average filled the 
evidentiary gap and facilitated enforcement of the FLSA’s important 
substantive policies.84 
Rather than trying a sample and averaging the sample verdicts, 
the trial judge in Tyson Foods relied on experts to find the facts in a 
sample of cases and allowed the jury to modify the sample average in 
light of testimonial and video evidence.85 But the key point is the 
same: the sample average is what controlled the outcome, not 
individualized fact finding, and as a result, some employees received 
more than their substantive entitlements and some received less.86 
It is true that the Court uses the sample average to support a 
rebuttable rather than a conclusive presumption of actual donning 
and doffing times.87 However, since Tyson kept no records of donning 
and doffing time, it could not rebut the presumption. So for all 
practical purposes, the presumption was conclusive.  
 
type evidence”); see also Edward K. Cheng, Reconceptualizing the Burden of Proof, 122 
YALE L.J. 1254, 1269 & n.30, 1271 (2013) (noting that “courts have generally rejected 
awarding damages to the plaintiff based on	.	.	.	‘naked’ statistical evidence” and tend to 
favor “individualized ‘direct’ proof”); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi & Andrew J. 
Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 810 (2001) (noting the 
preference of judges for individuating evidence over statistical evidence); Laurence H. 
Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 
1329, 1343–44, 1377 (1971) (noting that courts have been reluctant to rely on statistical 
evidence as sufficient alone and recommending great caution in the use of mathematical 
proof); Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, 
and Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1001, 
1050–51 (1988) (noting that “[j]udges generally have refused to accept naked statistics or 
ex ante causal probabilities as evidence of what actually happened on a particular 
occasion” and observing that “[t]hey instead have insisted on particularistic evidence and 
ex post causal probabilities based on such evidence”).  
 84. See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1047; see also infra notes 121–127 and 
accompanying text.  
 85. See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1043–44. This is similar to the way the court 
structured statistical adjudication in Hilao. See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 
782–84 (9th Cir. 1996); see also supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text. 
 86. Tyson Foods is unusual in going to trial; most class actions settle. The fact that it 
went to trial and that Tyson’s motion was filed after the trial verdict allowed the Court to 
defer heavily to the jury’s decision, or more precisely, to its characterization of the jury’s 
decision. It is worth noting, however, that in most cases, the permissibility of statistical 
adjudication will have to be decided much earlier, at the initial stage of class certification.  
 87. See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1047. 
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To be sure, when population variance is small, the sample 
average can be a reasonably good approximation of actual times. But 
this evidentiary benefit is not enough alone to justify shifting the 
burden to the defendant where there is case-specific evidence to 
support more accurate individual results or where individualized 
sampling is possible and likely to produce better estimates. In other 
words, there must be some special reason that justifies the use of 
aggregate sampling, regardless of whether it creates a conclusive or a 
rebuttable presumption. In Tyson Foods, that reason had to do with 
the evidentiary obstacle to enforcement created by the defendant’s 
failure to keep adequate records and the importance of enabling 
private enforcement of the FLSA’s substantive policies.88 Thus, Tyson 
Foods is similar to other statistical adjudication cases—the sample 
average is justified for its enforcement benefits and not merely for its 
probative value. 
2.  Inference of Liability and Damages? 
Having characterized the issue in terms of evidentiary inference, 
the Court then turned to the task of justifying the inference. To do 
this, it relied on a 1946 decision, Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery 
Co.89 The Court read Mt. Clemens to hold that a rebuttable inference 
of liability and damages based on the sample average was permissible 
in individual FLSA suits whenever the employer failed to keep 
adequate records of employee time.90 From this, it concluded that the 
 
 88. See infra Sections III.A.1.–.2. 
 89. 328 U.S. 680 (1946), superseded by statute, Act of May 14, 1947, ch. 52, sec. 4, 61 
Stat. 84, 86–87 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §	254(a) (2012)). Mt. Clemens was a 
representative suit for violation of the FLSA brought by a union and seven of its members 
on behalf of all similarly situated employees, in which about 300 employees and ex-
employees authorized the plaintiffs to represent them. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. v. 
Anderson, 149 F.2d 461, 461 (6th Cir. 1945), rev’d, 328 U.S. 680 (1946). 
 90. Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1047. Actually, it is not exactly clear how the district 
judge calculated the average time estimates in Mt. Clemens. The judge referred the case to 
a special master who, after hearing testimony from a number of witnesses, concluded that 
the computation of overtime would be too speculative to support recovery. See Mt. 
Clemens, 149 F.2d at 463–64. The district judge disagreed with the special master’s 
conclusion and created a formula based on what the Sixth Circuit refers to as an 
“estimated average of overtime worked.” See id. at 464–65. But it is not clear how the 
district judge calculated this “estimated average.” In the end, the Sixth Circuit held that 
“the arbitrary formula applied by the district judge, in lieu of acceptance of the master’s 
findings, produced a judgment based upon surmise and conjecture, which cannot be 
sustained.” Id. at 465. But the Supreme Court reversed. Mt. Clemens, 328 U.S. at 687. It 
held that when the employer fails to keep adequate time records, employees can prove 
their individual times by evidence sufficient to support a “just and reasonable inference.” 
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same inference applied to a class action aggregating those individual 
FLSA claims.91 
The trouble with relying on Mt. Clemens is that it did not go as 
far as the Tyson Foods Court assumes. The Mt. Clemens Court 
authorized the use of sampling to estimate damages, but only after 
liability was already established: 
In such a situation [where the employer fails to keep statutorily 
mandated records,] we hold that an employee has carried out 
his burden if he proves that he has in fact performed work for 
which he was improperly compensated and if he produces 
sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of that work 
as a matter of just and reasonable inference.	.	.	.	Nor is such a 
result to be condemned by the rule that precludes the recovery 
of uncertain and speculative damages. That rule applies only to 
situations where the fact of damage is itself uncertain. But here 
we are assuming that the employee has proved that he has 
performed work and has not been paid in accordance with the 
statute. The damage is therefore certain. The uncertainty lies 
only in the amount of damages arising from the statutory 
violation by the employer.92 
It is more difficult to justify the use of sampling to determine 
liability.93 I shall argue below that stretching Mt. Clemens to cover 
 
Id. But it also remanded “for the determination of the amount of walking time involved 
and the amount of preliminary activities performed, giving due consideration to the de 
minimis doctrine and calculating the resulting damages under the Act.” Id. at 694.  
 91. See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1046–47. The Mt. Clemens rule allowing sampling 
is, of course, a rule of federal law, raising the question of why it applies to the state-created 
IWPCL claim. The most likely answer is that the IWPCL claim is a hybrid state-federal 
claim that incorporates the rule. The IWPCL statute requires an employer to “pay all 
wages due its employees” but does not specify what wages are due. IOWA CODE ANN. 
§	91A.3 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Legis. Sess.). The plaintiffs in Tyson Foods relied on 
the FLSA to fill the gap. As the district judge noted, this made the IWPCL claim 
“essentially ‘duplicative’ of the FLSA claim.” Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 564 F. 
Supp. 2d 870, 883–84 (N.D. Iowa 2008). It follows that the Mt. Clemens rule, as a 
substantive component of the FLSA right, applies to the IWPCL claim as well: 
The parties do not dispute that, in order to prove a violation of the Iowa statute, 
the employees had to do no more than demonstrate a violation of the FLSA. In 
this opinion, then, no distinction is made between the requirements for the class 
action raising the state-law claims and the collective action raising the federal 
claims. 
Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1045. 
 92. Mt. Clemens, 328 U.S. at 687–88 (emphasis added). 
 93. It is worth noting, however, that some lower courts, before Tyson Foods, had 
extended Mt. Clemens to proof of liability as well as damages in FLSA cases. See, e.g., 
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liability makes sense as a policy matter. But it is significant to note 
here that the Tyson Foods majority fudged the issue rather than 
openly concede what it was doing and explicitly justify the broader 
use on legal and policy grounds.94 
3.  Trial by Formula? 
The Tyson Foods Court also had to deal with Wal-Mart’s 
rejection of sampling as “Trial by Formula.”95 This was not easy to do 
because the use of statistical adjudication in Tyson Foods was 
structurally very similar to its use in Wal-Mart. Wal-Mart was a 
putative class action brought on behalf of roughly 1.5 million female 
employees of Wal-Mart Stores nationwide.96 The class alleged Title 
VII disparate treatment claims based on a company-wide policy of 
gender discrimination in pay and promotion.97 The district court 
certified a Rule 23(b)(2) class action for injunctive, declaratory, and 
backpay relief, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.98 With respect to 
backpay, the Ninth Circuit suggested that the district court might use 
a sampling procedure that involved appointing a special master to 
 
Garcia v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 770 F.3d 1300, 1307 (10th Cir. 2014) (allowing representative 
evidence to prove liability in a FLSA case). Still, it is much easier to justify the use of 
sampling at the damages stage. It is well established that a plaintiff need only propose a 
method for estimating damages that permits a “	‘just and reasonable inference’	.	.	.	even 
though the result is only an approximation.” Cristallina S.A. v. Christie, Manson & Woods 
Int’l, Inc., 502 N.Y.S.2d 165, 173 (App. Div. 1986) (quoting Story Parchment Co. v. 
Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931)). One reason for this liberal 
approach is the unfairness of imposing the risk of uncertain measurement on a plaintiff 
when the defendant is a proven wrongdoer.  
 94. This is especially striking in light of Justice Thomas’s dissent, which takes the 
majority to task for misinterpreting Mt. Clemens in precisely this way. Tyson Foods, 136 S. 
Ct. at 1058 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 95. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 367 (2011). 
 96. Id. at 342. 
 97. Id. at 343. 
 98. See id. at 346–47. Rule 23(b)(2) authorizes a class action for injunctive and 
declaratory relief when the defendant “has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply 
generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is 
appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). While the Rule says 
nothing about monetary relief, lower courts before Wal-Mart routinely allowed backpay 
claims under the Rule 23(b)(2) umbrella on the theory that backpay was merely incidental 
to Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive relief. See, e.g., Thorn v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 445 F.3d 
311, 332 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[O]ur prior cases have held that Rule 23(b)(2) class certification 
is proper in the Title VII context	.	.	.	because injunctive or declaratory relief predominates 
despite the presence of a request for back pay.”); Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 
F.2d 211, 257 (5th Cir. 1974) (“Back pay has been granted by courts in (b)(2) class actions 
where injunctive or declaratory relief has also been requested	.	.	.	.”).  
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depose a random sample of class members and extrapolating from the 
sample results to an aggregate backpay award.99 
The Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the named 
plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate sufficient commonality for class 
certification.100 The Court also held that a Rule 23(b)(2) class action 
could not include backpay claims and criticized the Ninth Circuit’s 
proposed sampling procedure.101 With respect to the Rule 23(b)(2) 
backpay issue, the Court explained that in a Title VII case like Wal-
Mart, each class member has a presumptive entitlement to backpay 
once the class succeeds in proving a pattern and practice of 
discrimination.102 But Title VII then gives the employer the right to 
rebut the presumption for each employee if it can show lawful reasons 
for the employee’s particular treatment.103 The Supreme Court 
concluded that the Ninth Circuit’s sampling procedure deprived the 
defendant of its right to rebut the presumption in each individual 
case—i.e., its right “to litigate its statutory defenses to individual 
claims”—and thus altered the substantive law in violation of the 
REA.104 
The similarities to Tyson Foods are striking. In both cases, most 
class members had claims for monetary relief that were too small to 
support individual suits and therefore the only realistic way to 
provide relief was through a class action or other form of aggregation. 
In both cases, aggregate treatment was possible only if the court could 
calculate an aggregate award on a class-wide basis. In both cases, 
courts either proposed or implemented a form of statistical 
 
 99. Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. at 367. The Ninth Circuit described its proposed 
approach as follows: 
A sample set of the class members would be selected, as to whom liability for sex 
discrimination and the backpay owing as a result would be determined in 
depositions supervised by a master. The percentage of claims determined to be 
valid would then be applied to the entire remaining class, and the number of 
(presumptively) valid claims thus derived would be multiplied by the average 
backpay award in the sample set to arrive at the entire class recovery—without 
further individualized proceedings.  
Id. (citing Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 625–27 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 564 
U.S. 338 (2011)). This proposal followed the approach used in Hilao. See Hilao v. Estate of 
Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 782–84 (9th Cir. 1996); see also supra note 21–24 and accompanying 
text. 
 100. Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. at 359. 
 101. See id. at 366–67. 
 102. See id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
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adjudication to do this. And in both cases, the sample average was 
used to determine liability as well as damages.105 
Despite these similarities, the Tyson Foods Court managed to 
distinguish Wal-Mart. To do so, it focused on the heterogeneity of the 
two employee classes. According to the Court, the wide differences in 
employee circumstances across all Wal-Mart stores made the 
nationwide class too heterogeneous to permit the use of a sample 
average.106 In Tyson Foods, by contrast, “each employee worked in 
the same facility, did similar work, and was paid under the same 
policy.”107 This made the Tyson employee class much less 
heterogeneous, which justified application of the Mt. Clemens rule 
and allowed reliance on the sample average.108 
There are two notable problems with this line of reasoning. First, 
it does not match what the Court actually said in Wal-Mart. In Wal-
Mart, the problem with sampling was that it deprived the company of 
its right “to litigate its statutory defenses to individual claims.”109 
Given this, it is a bit surprising that the Tyson Foods Court relied on 
intra-class heterogeneity to distinguish Wal-Mart when it could have 
relied on the fact that a rebuttable presumption allows the defendant 
to present its defenses. Perhaps the Court worried that its supposedly 
rebuttable presumption was not actually rebuttable after all and that 
using the sample average to shift the burden on an element of the 
prima facie case when the defendant has no way to rebut the 
presumption is not all that different from cutting off a defense.110 In 
 
 105. See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1046–47 (2016); Wal-Mart 
Stores, 564 U.S. at 367. In Wal-Mart, the liability issue was whether Wal-Mart had lawful 
reasons for treating a particular employee the way it did. See Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. at 
366–67. In Tyson Foods, the liability issue was whether any given employee actually 
worked overtime. See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1047. 
 106. See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1048. The Court reasoned that this intra-class 
heterogeneity precluded the use of the sample average in an individual case, and then 
concluded that the Rules Enabling Act (“REA”) precluded its use in a class action as well. 
Id. (“Permitting the use of that sample in a class action, therefore, would have violated the 
Rules Enabling Act by giving plaintiffs and defendants different rights in a class 
proceeding than they could have asserted in an individual action.”). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Actually, the Court argues that since Mt. Clemens allowed the sample average to 
be used in an individual suit, it must also be available in a class action, or else there would 
be a REA violation. See id. at 1047–48. 
 109. Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. at 367. 
 110. The Tyson Foods Court noted that “[s]ince there were no alternative means for 
the employees to establish their hours worked [besides the sample average], [Tyson’s] 
primary defense was to show that Mericle’s study was unrepresentative or inaccurate.” 
Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1047. In other words, there was no point in giving Tyson a 
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any event, it is not clear what heterogeneity has to do with a right to 
litigate individual defenses. As long as the cases exhibit legally 
relevant differences, Wal-Mart would seem to require individual 
litigation. And legally relevant differences can exist even when a class 
has low heterogeneity. 
Second, Tyson Foods confuses Wal-Mart’s discussion of Rule 
23(a)(2) commonality with its discussion of Rule 23(b)(2) backpay 
relief.111 It is true that the Wal-Mart Court emphasized the sprawling 
and internally heterogeneous nature of the class, but it did so in the 
course of holding that the plaintiffs failed to provide enough evidence 
of a company-wide discriminatory policy to satisfy the Rule 23(a)(2) 
commonality requirement.112 The Rule 23(b)(2) backpay issue is 
different. It arises only after the plaintiffs prove the existence of a 
company-wide policy of discrimination, since it is only then that the 
presumptive right to backpay attaches.113 This makes a huge 
difference. If Wal-Mart actually has a company-wide discriminatory 
policy affecting pay and promotion, then that policy lends cohesion to 
the class and makes it more homogeneous than the Tyson Foods 
Court assumes. Indeed, it is not clear which is more heterogeneous: a 
Wal-Mart class subject to a company-wide discriminatory policy or a 
Tyson Foods class with substantial overtime variations.114 
Of course, the Tyson Foods Court had to do something to disarm 
Wal-Mart, and distinguishing precedent by reinterpreting it is a tried-
and-true strategy. But the way the Court distinguished Wal-Mart 
creates a problem for the use of sampling in other aggregations. The 
Court reasons that sampling is proper in class actions only because it 
is proper in individual suits.115 Thus, the permissibility of sampling in 
 
chance to defend against individual claims because it had nothing to present by way of 
defense. This brings the Tyson Foods case rather close to Wal-Mart. The point of Wal-
Mart is that sample averaging deprives parties of their right to litigate individual issues by 
averaging over individual facts. Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. at 367. 
 111. For example, the Tyson Foods Court says: “The plaintiffs in Wal-Mart proposed 
to use representative evidence as a means of overcoming [the] absence of a common 
policy [for purposes of determining an aggregate backpay award].” Tyson Foods, 136 S. 
Ct. at 1048. This is simply wrong. The “representative evidence” in Wal-Mart was to be 
used to determine backpay only after plaintiffs proved the existence of a common policy. 
See Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. at 367. 
 112. See Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. at 356–60. 
 113. Id. at 336–37. 
 114. The existence of a company-wide discriminatory policy is a good reason to believe 
that most employees suffered from discrimination, whereas the fact that Tyson employees 
worked in the same plant and were paid under the same gang-time system says nothing 
about their individual donning and doffing times. 
 115. See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1048. 
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individual suits is a necessary condition for the use of sampling in class 
actions. This limitation ignores important differences between a class 
action and an individual suit, differences that sometimes make 
sampling desirable in the former when it might not be desirable in the 
latter. This point is discussed at greater length in Part III below. 
III.  THE FUTURE OF SAMPLING AFTER TYSON FOODS 
The Tyson Foods Court expressly disavows “broad and 
categorical rules” and endorses a case-specific approach.116 It opens 
the door to broader use of sampling but provides little guidance to 
lower court judges, who must decide when and how to use it. The 
following discussion develops factors and principles to guide those 
decisions. Section A unpacks the factors that the Court actually 
identifies; Section B addresses sampling’s outcome effects; and 
Section C discusses some other relevant factors that should be taken 
into consideration. 
A word of clarification is in order at the outset. The following 
account is not the only reasonable interpretation of the Tyson Foods 
opinion. I offer it as the best principled interpretation. My claim is 
that the general principles that best fit and justify what the Court says 
and does in Tyson Foods have normative extension and justify 
sampling in a wider range of cases. 
A. The Court’s Factors 
The Tyson Foods Court mentions two factors that it considers 
relevant to the use of sampling: (1) “the purpose for which the sample 
is being introduced,” and (2) “the underlying cause of action.”117 In 
addition, the Court makes clear in its discussion of Wal-Mart that the 
degree of heterogeneity matters, and it also notes that any sampling 
methodology must be reliable.118 
 
 116. Id. at 1049. 
 117. Id. (“The fairness and utility of statistical methods in contexts other than those 
presented here will depend on facts and circumstances particular to those cases.”); see also 
id. at 1046 (“It follows that the Court would reach too far were it to establish general rules 
governing the use of statistical evidence, or so-called representative evidence, in all class-
action cases.”). 
 118. Id. at 1046 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 401, 403, 702) (stating that the permissibility of a 
statistical sample “turns	.	.	.	on the degree to which the evidence is reliable in proving or 
disproving the elements of the relevant cause of action”). 
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1.  The Purpose of Sampling 
The Court says little about the first factor, and its meaning is far 
from clear. As we have seen, sampling is sometimes used to generate 
statistical evidence helpful for determining case-specific facts.119 But 
this is not how it is used in Tyson Foods. The sample average is not 
just evidence of actual donning and doffing times; it is the time that 
determines liability for each employee.120 
When justifying the sample average, the Court relies on Tyson’s 
failure to keep adequate records of donning and doffing times.121 
Given this, one might reasonably read the Tyson Foods holding as 
limited to cases where the sample average is needed to overcome an 
evidentiary obstacle created by the defendant.122 However, I believe 
 
 119. See supra notes 8–11 and accompanying text. 
 120. See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1046–47. More precisely, the sample average in 
Tyson Foods shifts the burden to the defendant. See id. at 1047. In this respect, it might 
seem analogous to other doctrines that shift the burden on liability issues when rebuttal 
evidence is unlikely, such as the burden-shifting rule of Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 4–5 
(Cal. 1948), or market share theories in products liability, see Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 
P.2d 924, 937 (Cal. 1980). These analogies are useful, but they are also different from 
Tyson Foods in important ways. For one thing, the FLSA duty is statutory, and the statute 
prescribes that liability attaches only if the employee worked overtime. See 29 U.S.C. 
§	216(b) (2012). The Summers burden rule and market share theories are common law 
doctrines, and judges have more latitude to alter the liability elements of common law 
torts. Moreover, both of the common law burden-shifting rules apply only when the 
plaintiff proves that the defendant violated a legal standard owed to her. See Sindell, 607 
P.2d at 936; Summers, 199 P.2d at 3–4. In Summers v. Tice, for example, the plaintiff 
proved that both shooters were negligent; the only question was whose bullet actually hit 
the plaintiff. See Summers, 199 P.2d at 2. Market share theories impose liability based on a 
probabilistic estimate that the plaintiff used the particular brand, but they presuppose that 
the product itself is defective or the defendants are otherwise legal wrongdoers. See 
Sindell, 607 P.2d at 925–26, 936–37. To be sure, the Mericle and Fox studies make clear 
that Tyson failed to pay proper overtime compensation to some employees and thus 
violated the FLSA as to them. See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1043–44. But Tyson did not 
fail to pay overtime for every employee who benefited from the presumption. In other 
words, the Tyson Foods Court shifts the burden for all employees in the class without any 
proof that the FLSA overtime compensation duty was violated for each and every one. See 
id. at 1047–49. 
 121. See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1047. 
 122. In a draft article finalized too late for me to respond to here, Jonah Gelbach 
argues that Tyson Foods treats the sample average similar to how courts treat 
counterfactual evidence in other cases. Jonah B. Gelbach, The Triangle of Law and the 
Role of Evidence in Class Litigation, 165 U. PENN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) 
(manuscript at 9–12, 23), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2905911 [https://perma.cc/QVN6-6X53 
(staff-uploaded archive)]. I disagree. In the antitrust cases involving counterfactual 
evidence, for example, statistical evidence is required by the inherent nature of the 
substantive issue. See supra text accompanying note 11. The problem in Tyson Foods is 
different. Tyson employees actually worked the time they did; there is no need to posit a 
hypothetical state of affairs in order to make sense of the required liability element. The 
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that a broader interpretation better fits the Court’s reasoning. 
According to this interpretation, the existence of an evidentiary gap is 
not the crux of the problem; it is just the particular way that the 
problem manifested itself in the Tyson Foods case. Quoting Mt. 
Clemens, the Tyson Foods Court emphasized the “remedial nature” 
of the FLSA, the “great public policy	.	.	.	it embodies,” and the 
injustice of leaving an employer free to retain the benefits of 
employee work without paying for those benefits.123 It never said that 
these policy concerns are triggered only when enforcement is difficult 
because of an evidentiary gap. The existence of an evidentiary gap 
happened to be the enforcement obstacle in Tyson Foods and Mt. 
Clemens, but the reason why the gap mattered—that it frustrated the 
enforcement of important substantive policies—potentially extends to 
any obstacle that has the same effect. 
In this regard, it is important to bear in mind that the Court 
never treated Tyson’s failure to keep adequate records as a spoliation 
tort, nor did it limit its holding to situations where the defendant 
purposefully alters evidence in order to avoid liability.124 If Tyson had 
been guilty of spoliation, shifting the burden might have been justified 
on moral and evidentiary grounds.125 But the Court did not rely on the 
spoliation doctrine. Indeed, Tyson might have chosen not to keep 
adequate records simply because it believed—wrongly as it turned 
out—that its K-code times covered its FLSA obligations and thus that 
it did not have to incur the cost of keeping track of the daily donning 
and doffing times for each of its more than three thousand 
employees.126 
 
evidentiary gap does not inhere in the nature of the overtime issue; it arises from Tyson’s 
failure to keep records. Thus, use of the sample average must be justified in a different 
way. 
 123. Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1047 (quoting Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 
328 U.S. 680, 687 (1946), superseded by statute, Act of May 14, 1947, ch. 52, sec. 4, 61 Stat. 
84, 86–87 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §	254(a) (2012))); see Anderson, 328 U.S. at 
688 (“[T]he employer, having received the benefits of such work, cannot object to the 
payment for the work on the most accurate basis possible under the circumstances.”). 
 124. The spoliation doctrine allows a court to presume facts when a party manipulates 
the evidence so that the opposing party cannot prove the fact. See Lawrence Solum & 
Stephen Marzen, Truth and Uncertainty: Legal Control of the Destruction of Evidence, 36 
EMORY L.J. 1085, 1087–94 (1987) (explaining the spoliation inference). 
 125. See id. at 1138–40. 
 126. Cf. Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1059 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The majority thus 
puts employers to an untenable choice. They must either track any time that might be the 
subject of an innovative lawsuit, or they must defend class actions against representative 
evidence that unfairly homogenizes an individual issue.”). 
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Moreover, it is not even clear that violation of a statutory record-
keeping duty is a necessary condition for application of the Mt. 
Clemens rule. Some courts have applied Mt. Clemens without a 
record-keeping violation.127 This is consistent with the notion that 
sampling’s purpose is to enforce FLSA rights and secure the statute’s 
compensation and deterrence goals rather than to punish the 
defendant or incentivize record keeping. 
Thus, Tyson Foods, broadly interpreted, stands for the 
proposition that sampling can be used to overcome any serious proof 
obstacle that systematically deprives a large number of injured parties 
of compensation, impedes enforcement of the substantive law, and 
leaves the defendant free to retain the benefits of its unlawful 
conduct—provided, of course, that sampling is otherwise consistent 
with the applicable substantive law.128 This proposition and the 
principles it embodies apply not just to FLSA claims but also to the 
collective litigation of consumer protection, securities fraud, antitrust, 
and other cases involving small claims.129 In cases like these, the 
 
 127. See Villalpando v. Exel Direct Inc., Nos. 12-cv-04137-JCS, 13-3091-JCS, 2016 WL 
1598663, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2016) (construing Tyson Foods and Mt. Clemens to 
extend to situations where the employer’s failure to keep adequate records does not 
violate an explicit record-keeping duty). Nor does it matter that the defendant had reason 
to rely on third parties to keep records. Id. (rejecting the defendant’s argument that 
independent contractors should have kept the records). Moreover, the Mt. Clemens Court 
itself noted that its rule applied “even where the lack of accurate records grows out of a 
bona fide mistake as to whether certain activities or non-activities constitute work.” Mt. 
Clemens, 328 U.S. at 688. And a similar principle has been applied in other contexts that 
do not involve statutory record-keeping violations. See Melgar v. CSK Auto, Inc., No. 13-
cv-03769-EMC, 2015 WL 9303977, at *8–9 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2015) (allowing plaintiffs to 
rely on self-identification to satisfy the ascertainability requirement for class certification 
partly because the defendant failed to keep records and “even if there is no statute that 
explicitly requires recordkeeping for business expenses”).  
 128. It is also important to bear in mind that while overcoming serious proof obstacles 
supports sampling, there might be contrary principles weighing against its use in particular 
cases or rules that dictate a different result. For example, applied to most state claims, 
sampling would almost certainly be considered “substantive” and thus available only if the 
applicable state law allows it. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); see 
also Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 321 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding inter alia 
that the district court’s use of sampling impermissibly altered state substantive law in 
violation of the Erie command). 
 129. It is worth mentioning that the Supreme Court has been reluctant to embrace this 
proposition in the arbitration context when negative expected value claims are involved. 
In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013), for example, 
the Court held that a class waiver was enforceable in arbitration even though the plaintiffs’ 
federal antitrust claims were too small to justify proceeding individually. Id. at 2309–11 
(holding that the effective vindication doctrine applies to the “	‘prospective waiver of a 
party’s right to pursue statutory remedies’	.	.	.	.	[b]ut the fact that it is not worth the 
expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the elimination of the 
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defendant’s unlawful conduct systematically produces small harms to 
large numbers of geographically dispersed individuals.130 The obstacle 
to enforcement is not an evidentiary gap, but a negative expected 
value (“NEV”) problem.131 Most plaintiffs have too little at stake to 
cover the costs of an individual suit. Aggregation makes suit feasible 
by attracting an attorney willing to represent the group in return for a 
percentage of the total recovery. The problem with aggregation, 
however, is the presence of individual reliance, causation, and 
damages issues.132 Sampling solves this problem by enabling collective 
resolution of individual issues. 
Based on this interpretation, the Court’s purpose factor should 
support the use of statistical adjudication in a case like Wal-Mart. The 
backpay claims in Wal-Mart were for small amounts, too small to 
justify individual suits. Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s proposed sampling 
procedure removed a NEV obstacle that deprived claimants of their 
entitlement to recover backpay and impeded the enforcement of Title 
VII rights.133 The Supreme Court invoked the REA to reject the 
Ninth Circuit’s approach,134 and I shall discuss that argument later. 
For now, it is important to note that the purpose factor weighs in 
favor of sampling in a case like Wal-Mart. 
 
right to pursue that remedy” (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985))). It is difficult to see how this holding can be 
justified as a matter of procedural principle detached from the Federal Arbitration Act 
and the Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence, and it is unclear whether and how far 
the Court will apply it beyond the arbitration context. I am grateful to Maria Glover for 
alerting me to this point.  
 130. For a discussion noting the benefits and costs of small claims class actions, see 
generally Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class 
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991). 
 131. In other words, the expected cost of litigating an individual suit exceeds the 
expected recovery, so the suit has a negative expected value. See ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 20–36 (2003) (explaining expected 
value and negative expected value suits). 
 132. For example, these individual issues can make it difficult to satisfy the 
predominance requirement for certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class action. See Robert H. 
Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 792–807 (2013). These 
individual issues might be left to individual suits, but the cost of those suits, even narrowed 
to just these issues, is likely to be prohibitive given the small amounts at stake. 
 133. Given the centrality of Wal-Mart’s individual defenses to backpay claims, see Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 367 (2011), it would have been very difficult to 
satisfy the predominance requirement for a Rule 23(b)(3) class action without the use of 
sampling. 
 134. Id. 
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Tyson Foods is very similar to Wal-Mart in this regard. It is 
actually better understood as a small claims case with a NEV obstacle 
than a case with an evidentiary gap.135 The assumption that plaintiffs 
cannot prove liability without using the sample average is highly 
questionable. All Dr. Mericle did was average current donning and 
doffing times for a random sample of current employees. He had no 
access to historical information; Tyson kept no historical records of 
donning and doffing time. But this means that there was nothing 
stopping an individual employee from hiring Mericle or some other 
expert to videotape her own donning and doffing activity and average 
her personal times. Employee-specific averages would approximate 
individual donning and doffing times better than the employee-wide 
sample average used in the case. Thus, it is simply not true that Tyson 
employees had no alternative but to use Mericle’s sample averages. 
They could have used their own individual averages instead, and 
those would have produced more accurate liability determinations.136 
The problem is that many, if not all, Tyson employees had too 
little at stake to justify the expense of an individual time study. 
Moreover, employee-specific time studies would make the overtime 
issue an individual one, which could easily scuttle the aggregate 
treatment needed to overcome the NEV obstacle. If this is the 
problem, though, then statistical adjudication serves the same 
purpose in Tyson Foods as in Wal-Mart or any other case involving 
small claims: it removes a NEV obstacle to private enforcement of the 
substantive law.137 
 
 135. If Tyson had kept adequate records of donning and doffing times, employees 
presumably would have had to prove their overtime on an individualized basis. But that 
would have involved an easy mathematical calculation suitable for a computer and thus 
should not have scuttled aggregate treatment. However, if overtime involved a more 
complex analysis, for some reason, then the negative expected value (“NEV”) 
interpretation of Tyson Foods would support the use of sampling to enable aggregation—
even if Tyson had kept individual time records. 
 136. The class also included some former employees, and it would not be possible to 
videotape their current donning and doffing times since they no longer don and doff. But 
it would have been possible to videotape staged donning and doffing sessions by former 
employees. These employees might need some practice to remember how to do it, but 
afterward, their current times are likely to be a better approximation of their actual 
historical times than Mericle’s sample average. 
 137. It is worth noting, however, that private enforcement is not the only option for 
employees in these cases. The FLSA also authorizes suit by the Department of Labor to 
recover the same monetary relief that employees can obtain. See 29 U.S.C. §	216(c) (2012); 
Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 705 F.3d 770, 776 (7th Cir. 2013) (discussing the 
public enforcement alternative). Even so, the FLSA clearly contemplates private 
enforcement, and the Supreme Court recognizes the importance of private enforcement to 
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2.  The Underlying Cause of Action 
The second of the Court’s two factors—the underlying cause of 
action—also needs fleshing out. The elements of the cause of action 
define the legal and factual issues that are candidates for sampling, 
and the source of the cause of action—state or federal—affects 
whether a federal court must follow state law if sampling is 
substantive for Erie purposes.138 These are obvious points. But the 
cause-of-action factor plays another important role in the analysis. 
The substantive policies underlying the cause of action are critical to 
the justification for using sampling. 
The Tyson Foods Court makes this point clear when, quoting Mt. 
Clemens, it ties sampling to the “remedial nature of [the FLSA] and 
the great public policy which it embodies.”139 The Court does refer to 
the FLSA as a “remedial” statute and invokes the principle that 
remedial statutes should be construed generously.140 On a quick 
reading, this might lead one to conclude that sampling should be 
limited to remedial statutes. But this conclusion would be a mistake. 
There is no such thing as a special class of remedial statutes; every 
statute that provides remedies for legal wrongs is remedial.141 At 
most, the “remedial” label means that the policies underlying the 
statute strongly support providing relief to the favored group and thus 
 
realizing the policy goals of the Act. See Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 
680, 687–88 (1946), superseded by statute, Act of May 14, 1947, ch. 52, sec. 4, 61 Stat. 84, 
86–87 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §	254(a) (2012)). 
 138. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 139. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1047 (2016) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Mt. Clemens, 328 U.S. at 687). 
 140. See id. Other courts have relied on the remedial nature of the FLSA as support for 
interpreting its collective action provision liberally. See, e.g., Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. 
Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 173 (1989) (relying on the “broad remedial goal” of the FLSA to 
authorize trial judge assistance with giving notice of the collective action to employees); 
Church v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 137 F.R.D. 294, 306 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (holding that 
because the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) “is a remedial statute 
which is to be liberally construed in light of its purpose,” ADEA plaintiffs bringing a 
FLSA collective action do not have to show predominance of common questions to get 
conditional certification and thus be able to invite other employees to join in). 
 141. As the Seventh Circuit observed in a case involving the Labor-Management 
Reporting and Disclosure Act (“LMRDA”), 
Plaintiffs stress that the LMRDA is a remedial measure and seek a liberal 
construction. This maxim is useless in deciding concrete cases. Every statute is 
remedial in the sense that it alters the law or favors one group over 
another.	.	.	.	[A]fter we determine that a law favors some group, the question 
becomes: How much does it favor them? 
Stomper v. Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 241, 27 F.3d 316, 320 (7th Cir. 1994). 
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that the statute should be construed in a way that facilitates that 
goal.142 But this applies to any statutory claim that promotes strong 
substantive policies. 
It would also be a mistake to conclude from the fact that the 
FLSA expressly authorizes a collective action that sampling should be 
limited to only those statutory claims that include explicit class action, 
collective action, or other aggregation provisions.143 For one thing, the 
fact that a statute is silent does not mean that Congress does not value 
enforcement through aggregation. Congress might simply have 
assumed that there was no need for explicit authorization because 
Rule 23 or some other aggregation device was already available.144 
More importantly, the reason that Congress empowers aggregation 
for statutory claims is because it believes that aggregation is 
important to the enforcement of the statute’s substantive policies.145 
Thus, it is those policies that matter, not the presence or absence of 
congressional authorization.146 
This is exactly how the Tyson Foods Court justifies sampling—by 
reference to the underlying statutory policies, not the statutory text.147 
 
 142. See id. 
 143. Some courts have relied on the presence of the collective action provision to 
justify rules that facilitate employee use of the device. See, e.g., Hoffmann-La Roche, 493 
U.S. at 170. 
 144. Indeed, the reason for the FLSA’s collective action provision is not just to 
empower aggregation but also to limit aggregation to an opt-in procedure. See Daniel C. 
Lopez, Collective Confusion: FLSA Collective Actions, Rule 23 Class Actions, and the 
Rules Enabling Act, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 275, 283–84 (2009) (summarizing the 1947 
amendments to the FLSA). 
 145. See, e.g., Hoffman-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 173 (equating Congress’s decision to 
leave the FLSA’s aggregation provision “intact” with the courts’ duty to ensure that the 
“broad remedial goal of the statute	.	.	.	[is] enforced to the full extent of its terms”); 
Watkins v. Simmons & Clark, Inc., 618 F.2d 398, 402 n.8 (6th Cir. 1980) (referring to the 
“congressional purpose” behind the Truth in Lending Act’s class action provision as 
“using the threat of a class action to force compliance with the Act” and cautioning that 
subverting the class action could render “the prophylactic effect of class liability 
exposure	.	.	.	nonexistent”); G. W. Foster, Jr., Jurisdiction, Rights, and Remedies for Group 
Wrongs Under the Fair Labor Standards Act: Special Federal Questions, 1975 WIS. L. REV. 
295, 309 (arguing that the FLSA’s collective action provision was necessary to enforce the 
anti-unfair-competition purpose of the statute). 
 146. It would matter if the statute explicitly authorized, or rejected, sampling, not just 
aggregation. But the FLSA says nothing about sampling, and very few statutes do. For an 
example of a statute that expressly authorizes sampling, see 15 U.S.C. §	15d (2012) 
(authorizing statistical sampling to measure damages in a parens patriae antitrust action). 
 147. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1047 (2016) (relying on the 
“remedial nature” of and the “great public policy” behind the FLSA (quoting Anderson v. 
Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687 (1946), superseded by statute, Act of May 14, 
1947, ch. 52, sec. 4, 61 Stat. 84, 86–87 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §	254(a) (2012)))). 
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It enlists the FLSA’s substantive policies to justify sampling in an 
individual suit.148 It then concludes that if sampling is available in an 
individual suit, it must also be available in a Rule 23 class action 
because of the REA.149 
Drawing on substantive law policies to justify the use of sampling 
makes sense in general. The primary goal of adjudication is to enforce 
the substantive law, and the point of enforcement is to promote the 
policies that the substantive law serves. Since the reason to use 
sampling is to better enforce those policies, the case for it must be 
stronger when those policies are stronger. 
More precisely, in any litigation, the substantive policies at stake 
affect the magnitude of the expected error costs from using a 
procedure. Sometimes plaintiffs recover when the defendant is not in 
fact liable (a false positive error), and sometimes they fail to recover 
when the defendant is in fact liable (a false negative error).150 Each of 
these two types of error generates its own costs, both to the losing 
party and to society at large (as the term is used here, “costs” include 
all types of negative effects, including moral as well as economic 
harms). Procedures often reduce one type of error while increasing 
the other. This is true for sampling. A sampling procedure reduces 
false negatives by enabling deserving plaintiffs to recover, but it also 
increases false positives by allowing everyone in the class to recover, 
including those who have suffered no legal wrong. Whether sampling 
is justified, therefore, depends on the relative costs of these two types 
of error. And those costs must be measured in terms of the 
substantive law values at stake.151 
 
 148. See id. It is also worth mentioning that basing FLSA liability on average times has 
a certain normative appeal. An average time is likely to be a reasonable time, and a 
reasonableness standard might seem an appropriate measure of an employer’s obligation 
in this context. It is possible that the normative appeal of the sample average in these 
FLSA suits contributed to the Court’s willingness to authorize its use in the case. 
However, the Court never mentioned this point and relying on it to justify the sample 
average would be tantamount to altering the FLSA, which could create separation-of-
powers and REA problems. I am indebted to my colleague Larry Sager for alerting me to 
this point. 
 149. See id. at 1046. 
 150. For a more comprehensive account of error costs, see BONE, supra note 131, at 
128–46. 
 151. There are two additional complications. First, expected process costs also matter. 
Process costs include all the costs of applying the sampling procedure, including the costs 
of hearings to decide whether to use it, the costs of designing it, and the costs of actually 
implementing it. Id. at 146. Second, the optimal balance of expected error and process 
costs depends on one’s normative theory of procedure and, in particular, on whether that 
theory is efficiency-based or rights-based. See Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 7, 
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The Tyson Foods Court reads the FLSA as placing a very high 
social value on vindicating employee rights. In effect, the Court 
assumes that false negatives—denying compensation to deserving 
employees—are much more costly than false positives—forcing 
employers to pay compensation to some employees whose FLSA 
rights have not been violated. This is the point of emphasizing the 
“remedial nature of [the FLSA] and the great public policy which it 
embodies.”152 Under these circumstances, a procedure like sampling, 
which reduces the more costly false negative error, is desirable as long 
as it does not increase false positives by too much.153 
In sum, the Court’s cause-of-action factor and its purpose factor 
work together to justify sampling. If the purpose of sampling is to 
remove a serious barrier to relief and if removing that barrier enables 
enforcement of important social policies served by the cause of 
action, without seriously impairing other relevant policies, then there 
is a strong argument for sampling. 
3.  Heterogeneity and Reliability 
As we have seen, the Tyson Foods Court distinguishes Wal-Mart 
by relying on the degree of heterogeneity within the employee 
group.154 Heterogeneity matters because it affects the reliability of a 
sampling methodology. The more that individuals within the 
population differ from one another, the less certain it is that the 
 
at 595–617 (analyzing statistical adjudication under efficiency-based and rights-based 
theories). 
 152. Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1047 (quoting Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 
328 U.S. 680, 687 (1946), superseded by statute, Act of May 14, 1947, ch. 52, sec. 4, 61 Stat. 
84, 86–87 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §	254(a) (2012))). 
 153. As I explain below, the precise way this works is different for an efficiency theory 
of procedure than for a rights-based theory. See infra Section III.B. In an efficiency theory, 
for example, whether false positives are increased “by too much” depends on four 
variables: (1) the cost of false positives, (2) the cost of false negatives, (3) the amount by 
which sampling reduces the probability of false negatives, and (4) the amount by which 
sampling reduces expected process (litigation) costs. See BONE, supra note 131, at 128–55 
(describing an error cost analysis). To illustrate, suppose that the cost of a false negative is 
20, the cost of a false positive is 10, sampling reduces the probability of a false negative 
error by 10% (say from 20% to 10%), and sampling reduces expected process costs by 2. 
In this stylized example, the expected benefit of sampling is the savings in false negative 
error costs, which is 2 (i.e., 0.1	×	20	=	2) plus the savings in expected process costs, which is 
also 2—for a total benefit of 4. Therefore, if sampling increases expected false positive 
error costs by more than 4, costs would exceed benefits and sampling would not be 
desirable. Given the assumption that the cost of a false positive error is 10, sampling would 
increase expected false positive error costs by more than 4 if it increased the probability of 
a false positive error by more than 40%. 
 154. See supra notes 106–08 and accompanying text. 
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sample average is a good estimate of the population average or of 
actual values for each individual. One can handle this problem by 
using a larger sample size or a stratified sampling procedure (or 
regression); however, doing so increases litigation costs. 
For a utilitarian committed to economic efficiency, what matters 
is the balance of costs and benefits.155 As heterogeneity increases, the 
costs of adjusting the sampling procedure to compensate for it also 
increase. At some point, the marginal costs exceed the marginal 
benefits, and this is the point where the degree of heterogeneity bars 
sampling. 
For someone committed to a rights-based theory, heterogeneity 
works a bit differently, but the conclusion is the same—it all depends 
on the case. For example, as we shall see, a rights-based jurist can 
accept sampling even when it produces a substantial divergence 
between average recovery and actual entitlement if the alternative is 
worse for rights. This was the case in Tyson Foods and Wal-Mart, 
where plaintiffs would not have been able to recover at all without 
the collective adjudication made possible through sampling.156 
In sum, a properly designed sampling procedure should satisfy 
heterogeneity constraints in many cases. This is because 
heterogeneity is relevant mostly as a factor in determining the 
reliability of the statistical methodology.157 
B. Justifying Sampling’s Outcome Effects 
Sampling can produce more accurate outcomes than individual 
trials if the heterogeneity of the aggregation is small enough and the 
 
 155. Actually, a utilitarian should be interested in the real world incentives generated 
by the combination of substantive and procedural law. These incentives are affected by 
outcome error, of course, but they can also be directly affected by procedure without 
regard to effects on outcome error. For example, a procedural system that produces high 
litigation costs might deter socially undesirable conduct in a direct way if actors anticipate 
being sued when they violate the law and incur high litigation costs as a result. In other 
words, high litigation costs are not just costs of the system; they are also benefits insofar as 
they add to the procedural system’s deterrent effect. It follows that reducing litigation 
costs can weaken deterrence, all other things equal. I ignore this refinement in the text. 
 156. See supra notes 128–37 and accompanying text. 
 157. Reliability is usually tested in a Daubert hearing. See FED. R. EVID. 702; Daubert 
v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). It is also worth mentioning that judges 
might need the assistance of neutral experts, perhaps appointed as special masters or as 
expert witnesses, to evaluate and implement a reliable statistical approach. See FED. R. 
CIV. P. 53 (authorizing the appointment of special masters); FED. R. EVID. 706 (allowing 
the court to appoint expert witnesses). 
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error risk of individual suits is large enough.158 When the aggregation 
is nearly homogeneous, the sample average is quite a good estimate 
of the correct result for every case. Indeed, this estimate could be 
even better than the trial verdict in an individual suit if that verdict is 
likely to deviate from the correct outcome by a large margin because 
of a high risk of trial error.  
However, these two conditions—low heterogeneity and large 
individual trial error—are not easily satisfied. There is no assurance 
that the aggregation will have low heterogeneity, especially with 
respect to the individual issues for which sampling is used.159 
Moreover, because of limited information, judges will have great 
difficulty sorting between aggregations that meet the conditions and 
aggregations that do not.160 
Thus, we must address the fact that sampling can increase the 
error risk for at least some, and perhaps many, cases in the 
distribution and systematically distort outcomes relative to 
substantive entitlements. In Tyson Foods, for example, the sample 
average generated overtime liability for some employees who did not 
in fact work overtime, and it also likely denied overtime liability for 
some employees who did work overtime.161 Moreover, because 
everyone receives the average, sampling overcompensates deserving 
plaintiffs with below-average claims and undercompensates deserving 
plaintiffs with above-average claims. 
 
 158. See Bavli, supra note 5, at 82–83 (demonstrating that sampling will reduce the 
aggregate error risk on average if the variance of the aggregation, what Bavli calls “claim 
variability,” is less than the error risk for an individual suit, what Bavli calls “judgment 
variability”); Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 7, at 578–84 (noting that whether 
sampling improves accuracy for all cases in the aggregation depends on the heterogeneity 
of the aggregation and the error risk in an individual suit); Michael J. Saks & Peter David 
Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in the 
Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815, 833–37 (1992). In considering the effect of 
sampling on error risk, one must be careful to distinguish between aggregate effects and 
case-specific effects. Sampling might reduce the expected error risk for the aggregation as 
a whole, but still increase and also skew the error risk for cases far out on the tail of the 
distribution. The aggregate effect is what matters for an efficiency theory, but, as we shall 
see, case-specific effects matter for a rights-based theory. 
 159. As noted above, sampling is useful for overcoming the predominance obstacle to 
certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class action. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
 160. It might be possible to use sequential sampling to gather more information about 
the population distribution, but this is complicated and can be costly. See Bavli, supra note 
5, at 84–85. 
 161. See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1055 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). The latter cases would arise if an employee took longer than the average 
donning and doffing time and the difference would have pushed the employee above forty 
hours per week. 
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The seriousness of these outcome effects depends on one’s 
normative theory of procedure. A utilitarian committed to economic 
efficiency cares only that outcomes generate optimal incentives 
overall.162 Sampling fares well by this measure.163 As far as 
defendant’s incentives are concerned, what matters is the defendant’s 
total liability, and the sample average multiplied over all the cases in 
the aggregation is a very good estimate of that.164 As for potential 
plaintiffs, they adjust their pre-injury behavior according to what they 
think will happen if they are injured. Thus, the fact that plaintiffs 
receive more or less than their substantive entitlements is not a 
problem for a utilitarian because pre-injury expectations average over 
all possible cases, just as the sample average does.165 And even if 
sampling introduces some distortion, the resulting social costs might 
well be offset by the savings in litigation costs that sampling produces 
in large enough case aggregations. 
Skewed outcomes are more troubling for a rights-based 
procedure theory. Roughly speaking, a rights-based theory assumes 
that parties have procedural rights that trump or substantially 
constrain arguments for limiting procedure based on minimizing 
social costs, maximizing aggregate welfare, or pursuing collective 
 
 162. See Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 
23 J. Legal Stud. 307, 309–10 (1994) (focusing on how procedural accuracy affects ex ante 
behavior and incentives). 
 163. This discussion is a summary of the analysis that I develop more fully in other 
writing. See Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 7, at 595–98. 
 164. More precisely, what matters for a rational and risk-neutral defendant is expected 
liability, and the sample average does a very good job of estimating expected liability for a 
representative aggregation of cases and a large enough random sample. See BONE, supra 
note 131, at 20–36 (explaining expected liability and expected value). Also, sampling 
reduces outcome variance and thus should improve incentives for risk-averse defendants. 
 165. This is true as long as the aggregation is representative of the larger population of 
potential cases and the sampling procedure is reliable. More precisely, a plaintiff’s ex ante 
incentives depend on her expected recovery, and expected recovery is just an average over 
all possible future cases. To illustrate, suppose that there are 100 plaintiffs; that the 
defendant is not liable at all to 10 of these plaintiffs; and that among the 90 to whom it is 
liable, 20 suffered damages of 30,000, 50 suffered damages of 20,000, and 20 suffered 
damages of 10,000. If a sample of 10 cases is randomly drawn from the population of 100, 
we would expect 1 case of no liability, 2 cases with 30,000 damages, 5 cases with 20,000 
damages, and 2 cases with 10,000 damages. Assuming perfect accuracy, if all the 
sample cases were tried, then the sample average would equal: 
[(1	×	0)	+	(2	×	30,000)	+	(5	×	20,000)	+	(2	×	10,000)]	÷	10	=	18,000. Therefore, the 
defendant’s total liability would be the sample average multiplied by the 100 cases in the 
population, which is 18,000	×	100	=	1,800,000. This is exactly the same as the defendant’s 
total liability if all cases were tried individually, again assuming perfectly accurate trials. 
That total would be (10	×	0)	+	(20	×	30,000)	+	(50	×	20,000)	+	(20	×	10,000)	=	1,800,000. 
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social goals.166 The main problem from a rights-based perspective is 
sampling’s impact on a plaintiff’s rights. To be sure, the defendant’s 
rights matter just as much as the plaintiff’s. But defendant’s rights are 
not seriously affected by a well-designed sampling procedure. This is 
so because defendant’s total liability is roughly the same with 
sampling as without, and defendant’s total liability is what should 
matter to any sensible rights-based theory.167 The defendant pays 
some plaintiffs more than it should but it pays others less than it 
should, and the errors cancel out. 
The effect on plaintiffs’ rights is more serious because errors do 
not cancel on the plaintiffs’ side. Some plaintiffs receive less than 
what their substantive rights guarantee and others receive more. Even 
so, the distortion is not itself disqualifying. If it were, the Court’s 
endorsement of sampling in Tyson Foods would be open to criticism. 
More importantly, many of the situations where sampling makes the 
most sense are situations where skewed outcomes can be justified 
within a rights-based theory.168 
For example, if individuals are unable to sue or recover without 
the use of sampling, there is no reason to reject the procedure just 
because it distorts outcomes. As discussed above, this is the situation 
in Tyson Foods, as well as for the backpay claims in Wal-Mart.169 In 
these cases, sampling makes it possible to satisfy rights claims that 
would otherwise go unmet. There is no sensible rights-based ground 
to complain about that result, at least as long as the sampling 
procedure is designed to minimize distortions. 
Also, even if individuals can sue and recover without sampling, it 
matters that they save litigation costs with sampling.170 If the litigation 
cost savings equal or exceed the shortfall due to averaging, a plaintiff 
will be no worse off with sampling, and might even be better off than 
she would in an individual suit, despite obtaining a formal judgment 
 
 166. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 93–94 (1985); Robert G. 
Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem with Contractarian Theories of Procedural 
Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV. 485, 513–16 (2003). 
 167. Technically, the defendant’s procedural right attaches to each individual suit, not 
to the aggregation as a whole. However, the distribution of error risk across cases is what 
matters from a rights-based perspective. See infra notes 175–78 and accompanying text. 
And a defendant has no ground to complain about a distribution that leaves its total 
liability intact. 
 168. See generally Lahav, supra note 5 (defending the use of sampling on the ground 
that it promotes outcome equality). 
 169. See supra notes 128–37 and accompanying text. 
 170. Professor Jay Tidmarsh relies on a similar point to justify his presumptive 
judgment approach. See Tidmarsh, supra note 2, at 1487–88. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 607 (2017) 
2017] STATISTICAL ADJUDICATION 647 
or settlement less than what her right guarantees. This result should 
satisfy any rights-based concerns.171 
Moreover, there is no reason to worry about outcome effects 
under a rights-based theory when a plaintiff consents to sampling. 
Indeed, a plaintiff with a high-value claim can opt out of a Rule 
23(b)(3) class action and does not need to join a FLSA collective 
action if she believes she will fare worse with sampling.172 To be sure, 
plaintiffs have imperfect information when they make opt-out or opt-
in decisions, and it is more difficult to infer consent when a party 
lacks some of the information necessary to make an informed choice. 
But it is important to remember that parties make lots of outcome-
determinative choices in litigation with less-than-perfect information. 
Finally, the essential consideration for a rights-based theory is 
not the magnitude of the error risk itself but the distribution of that 
risk across litigants and cases and, in particular, the reasons why it is 
distributed the way it is.173 To see this point clearly, it is useful to 
begin by noting that sampling’s effect in producing outcomes that 
 
 171. One might object that litigation cost savings should not be considered because 
they are not part of the substantive right. However, this position is untenable. If litigation-
related costs are irrelevant, then it would not matter to a rights-based theory that a 
plaintiff who files late in the litigation queue recovers very little or nothing at all because 
of high delay costs or insufficient remaining assets. The formal judgment or settlement 
would be enough even if it was (virtually) worthless in practical terms. No litigation system 
that purports to respect rights can possibly be satisfied with such a result. For more on this 
point, see Bone, Actuarial Litigation, supra note 7, at 253–54. 
 172. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v). Opt out might scuttle the class action if the 
class unravels as the sample average changes. Whether this will happen depends, among 
other things, on the litigation cost savings with aggregation and sampling. In any event, 
this is a factor to consider when deciding whether to sample, but it is not relevant to rights-
based objections. 
 173. For an excellent discussion of this point, see DWORKIN, supra note 166, at 93–94; 
see also Robert G. Bone, Procedure, Participation, Rights, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1011, 1013–18 
(2010). According to Professor Dworkin, procedural rights should be understood as rights 
to equal concern and respect in the distribution of the risk of outcome error. DWORKIN, 
supra note 166, at 92–93. Dworkin’s analysis is too complicated to review in detail here. In 
a nutshell, he argued that outcome errors produce “moral harm” as well as “bare harm.” 
See id. at 80–81. Moral harm consists of the injustice associated with failing to honor 
substantive legal rights, and thus is always produced by outcome error. While bare harm is 
suitable for utilitarian balancing, moral harm is properly the subject of rights. Roughly, 
each party has a procedural right to a distribution of error risk that reflects equal concern 
and respect for the importance of the moral harm at stake. Id. at 92–93 (noting that each 
party has “a right to procedures justified by the correct assignment of importance to the 
moral harm the procedures risk, and a related right to a consistent evaluation of that harm 
in the procedures afforded them as compared with the procedures afforded others in 
different civil cases”). Thus, Dworkin focused mainly on the distribution of error risk and 
saw procedural rights as constraining the set of acceptable distributions. 
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differ from substantive entitlements cannot by itself be enough to 
condemn the procedure. Obviously, all procedure generates outcome 
error; no conceivable procedural system could possibly enforce the 
substantive law perfectly. So if the mere possibility of error were 
enough, then all procedures would have to be condemned. Moreover, 
it also makes no sense to specify some maximum level of error risk for 
all cases, because the acceptable level varies with the type of case.174 
For these reasons, a rights-based theory focuses on the 
distribution, rather than the absolute magnitude, of the error risk. It 
insists that this distribution treat all right holders with equal concern 
and respect. Whether a particular distribution satisfies this condition 
depends on the reasons for the distribution. A procedure like 
sampling can distribute error risk unevenly and still be justified 
provided the reasons for using the procedure accord all claimants 
equal concern and respect as individual right holders.175 Reducing 
social costs is not a good enough reason because it does not respect 
litigants as holders of procedural rights that trump or constrain 
aggregate cost reduction. However, assuring fair and just treatment 
for all litigants can be good enough. 
For example, when mass tort cases are litigated individually, 
plaintiffs who file late can experience serious delay if early filers clog 
the courts.176 Delay is costly because it reduces the real value of any 
 
 174. More generally, it makes no sense to frame the procedural right as a right to a 
specific level of error risk. See Bone, supra note 166, at 513–16. There is no natural way to 
define the requisite level. The right cannot guarantee perfect accuracy because perfect 
accuracy is impossible. Nor can it guarantee maximal accuracy because there is no limit to 
maximal accuracy. We can always improve accuracy by trying a case multiple times and 
using the most frequently occurring result or the average of the trial verdicts, but that 
means that a right to maximal accuracy would commit society to spending all its resources 
on procedure—a clearly absurd result. See id. at 514. Finally, formulating the right as a 
right to a “reasonable” risk of error begs the question what is “reasonable,” and defining it 
as a right to a “fair hearing” begs the question what is “fair.” 
 175. For example, plausibility pleading, applied strictly, can make it difficult for 
plaintiffs to file suit when the defendant has exclusive possession of the information the 
plaintiff needs to make the necessary allegations, and as a result it can systematically skew 
error in the defendant’s favor. See Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the 
Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 925–28 (2009). This does not necessarily 
mean, however, that plausibility pleading violates procedural rights any more than notice 
pleading does (by increasing the risk of in terrorem settlements). It all depends on the 
reasons for the rule and the resulting error-risk distribution. See id. at 912–15 (describing a 
rights-based analysis of pleading rules). 
 176. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 866–67 (1999) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (noting the extremely long delays in adjudicating asbestos cases due to the 
huge number of filed lawsuits, and the resulting impact on plaintiffs). Also, in a limited 
fund case, where the defendant does not have enough assets to satisfy all the plaintiffs’ 
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recovery. The order of filing, however, is often just a matter of luck, 
contingent on when an injury happens to occur or become manifest, 
and there is no moral reason why luck should make a difference to 
what a plaintiff recovers. Aggregation reduces delay cost and evens 
out its impact,177 and sampling makes aggregation possible. It is true 
that plaintiffs with high-value claims receive less than their 
substantive entitlements.178 But not everyone can recover fully. The 
choice, therefore, is between giving full recovery to some and nothing 
to others, or distributing the error risk in a way that treats each 
person as an equal right holder. A rights-based theory opts for the 
latter and justifies sampling as a means to that end. 
In sum, it is important that a court justify the use of sampling in a 
way that addresses systematic outcome effects. Sampling is relatively 
easy to justify within an efficiency-based theory, but a rights-based 
theory imposes tighter constraints. Still, no matter which theory one 
adopts, sampling can always be justified when it makes possible the 
litigation of small claims, when its litigation cost savings compensate 
for any outcome shortfall, or when plaintiffs consent to its use. It can 
also be justified when the aggregation it supports improves the 
justness and fairness of the error risk distribution. 
C. Other Factors 
There are additional factors that should be considered when 
deciding whether to use sampling. I have discussed many of these in 
my other writing,179 and I will only summarize them here. 
First, by speeding up recovery and reducing litigation and delay 
costs, sampling attracts more lawsuits, and the resulting increase in 
litigation can produce excessive deterrence.180 This is especially 
 
claims, those plaintiffs who file suit early obtain full recovery while those who file late, 
after the defendant’s limited assets have been exhausted, receive nothing beyond a formal 
judgment. See 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §	1774, at 30–32 (3d ed. 2005) (citing Norman C. 
Sabbey, Rule 23: Categories of Subsection (b), 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 539, 541 
(1969)). Aggregation through sampling helps redress this inequality by permitting an 
equitable distribution that binds everyone. See id. §	1774, at 32. 
 177. See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 866–68 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. 
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 632–33 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 178. A trial judge can, and in some cases should, reduce the divergence by using a 
stratified sample or possibly even regression techniques. 
 179. See Bone, Actuarial Litigation, supra note 7, at 239–59; Bone, Statistical 
Adjudication, supra note 7, at 576–94.  
 180. Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 7, at 596. 
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problematic when the aggregation made possible by sampling 
increases liability exposure beyond what Congress envisioned when it 
created the substantive claim.181 Judges should be aware of these risks 
and possibly deny sampling when they are too serious. But the 
possibility of overdeterrence in some cases should not bar sampling 
across the board. 
Second, sampling can reduce the amount plaintiffs are willing to 
invest in litigation relative to the defendant, and the resulting 
asymmetry can skew error risk in the defendant’s favor.182 However, 
there are many factors that affect litigation investment incentives, and 
it is not at all clear how significant this particular one is. In any event, 
as I have explained elsewhere, the asymmetry can be reduced by 
careful choice of the sampling protocol.183 
Third, sampling can reduce incentives to settle by affecting the 
size of the settlement surplus.184 This is not necessarily a serious 
concern, however, because many factors affect settlement incentives. 
Moreover, the problem with reduced settlement incentives is that it 
produces more trials, and sampling might save enough in litigation 
costs to compensate for any trial costs it adds. 
Fourth, any evaluation of sampling must take account of its 
impact on the filing of frivolous claims.185 Since sampling relieves 
 
 181. Although they do not involve sampling, class actions for statutory damages can 
impose crippling liability beyond what Congress likely intended, especially in cases 
involving minor, if any, actual harm. See, e.g., Parker v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 331 F.3d 
13, 21–22 (2d Cir. 2003) (recognizing the risk that class certification could lead to a 
potentially devastating damages award disproportionate to the harm actually suffered in a 
case with twelve million individuals seeking statutory damages authorized by the Cable 
Communications Policy Act).  
 182. See Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 7, at 589–90. For example, suppose a 
court has an aggregation of 1,000 cases and tries a sample of 100. The defendant will invest 
in the 100 sampled cases based on its expected liability over all 1,000 cases. If sample-case 
plaintiffs receive the sample average, however, they will invest suboptimally because they 
have incentives to free ride on other sample-case plaintiffs and are not able to capture all 
the benefits they confer on the other plaintiffs in the aggregation. Thus, free riding and 
externalities can lead plaintiffs to invest less in the sampled cases than the defendant, 
which should increase the defendant’s chance of winning assuming that a party is more 
likely to win the more she invests relative to her opponent. 
 183. Id. at 590–91. The asymmetry can be minimized in many cases by giving the 
sample average to all the plaintiffs in the aggregation and spreading the litigation costs 
evenly among them. See id. As it happens, these conditions were satisfied in the Tyson 
Foods case, where the sample average was applied to all employees in the class and 
sampling costs were borne proportionately by all class members. See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. 
Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1043–44 (2016). 
 184. See Bone, Actuarial Litigation, supra note 7, at 244–47. 
 185. Id. at 250–51. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 607 (2017) 
2017] STATISTICAL ADJUDICATION 651 
litigants of the need to prove liability and damages on an 
individualized basis, it creates incentives for lawyers to pack the class 
or other aggregation with frivolous and weak claims. However, this 
adverse selection problem inheres in all aggregations, whether or not 
they use sampling. For example, class actions frequently end in 
aggregate settlements based on average claim values, and this 
averaging process creates incentives to include as many claims as 
possible in the class, regardless of merit. Yet this risk is not thought 
serious enough to reject the class action device outright. Indeed, the 
class in Tyson Foods included some employees who had meritless 
claims, but this did not stop the Court from allowing sampling. The 
risk of frivolous filings should be an important factor in judicial 
decisions whether to authorize sampling, just as it should be in 
judicial decisions whether to certify a class or approve a class 
settlement. But sampling should not be denied just because it 
encourages the filing of some frivolous claims. 
Fifth, depending on how it is structured, sampling can deny 
participation opportunities to many plaintiffs.186 When everyone 
receives the sample average, only those plaintiffs in the sampled cases 
have a chance to litigate the issues.187 The significance of this fact, 
however, depends on whether individual participation is valued for 
outcome quality reasons or process-oriented dignitary reasons.188 If 
outcome quality is the focus, there is no cause for concern as long as 
the sample plaintiffs vigorously litigate their cases and the sample is 
representative of the aggregation. When a case is vigorously litigated, 
there is no reason to believe that a second case will produce a more 
accurate result from a social perspective. The second plaintiff might 
win when the first loses, but that does not mean that the result in the 
second case is more accurate than the result in the first. 
Dignity is a different matter. Many proceduralists believe that 
personal participation and control are required to respect the dignity 
of persons affected by litigation, entirely apart from any impact on 
 
 186. For an in-depth discussion of this point, see Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra 
note 7, at 617–50. 
 187. See id. at 618. The Court might allow non-sampled plaintiffs to intervene in the 
sampled cases, but managing a large set of plaintiffs is likely to be very burdensome and 
will end up diluting individual participation if the judge has to appoint a litigation steering 
committee. 
 188. See JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 158–253 
(1985).  
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outcome quality.189 Even the United States Supreme Court recognizes 
a robust due process right to a personal “day in court” that is difficult 
to justify except with a dignitary theory.190 
A dignity-based participation right, however, is not an 
insurmountable barrier to sampling. For one thing, the class action 
already curtails participation opportunities, and this is considered 
justifiable because the named plaintiffs represent the interests of 
absent class members.191 By this same logic, it should be possible to 
justify sampling as part of that representational relationship—the 
named plaintiffs and class attorney choose sampling on behalf of the 
class, just as they choose any other litigation strategy. 
More generally, the participation right is best understood as a 
flexible institutional right, not an absolute autonomy right.192 By 
 
 189. See, e.g., id. at 162–63; Martin H. Redish & William J. Katt, Taylor v. Sturgell, 
Procedural Due Process, and the Day-in-Court Ideal: Resolving the Virtual Representation 
Dilemma, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1877, 1893–94 (2009); Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural 
Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 275–77 (2004) (linking individual participation to 
legitimacy); see also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Together: Social, Moral, and 
Legal Obligations, 91 B.U. L. REV. 87, 103–11 (2011) (exploring the non-outcome-based, 
collectively-oriented benefits of aggregation and implications for procedure).  
 190. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892–93 (2008) (quoting Richards v. Jefferson 
Cty., 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996)); Robert G. Bone, The Puzzling Idea of Adjudicative 
Representation: Lessons for Aggregate Litigation and Class Actions, 79 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 577, 585–86 (2011) (explaining why Taylor’s strong day-in-court right can be 
supported only by a process-oriented participation theory). 
 191. Taylor, 553 U.S. at 894 (recognizing the class action as an exception to the general 
rule against nonparty preclusion). 
 192. Bone, supra note 190, at 614–16. It might be tempting to invoke the balancing test 
of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), to justify limits on the day-in-court 
participation right and make room for sampling. See id. at 334–35; see also Hilao v. Estate 
of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 786–87 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying the Mathews test to address a 
due process challenge to sampling). There are at least three problems with this strategy. 
First, the Mathews test focuses mainly on the instrumental value of procedure in producing 
accurate outcomes, whereas the day-in-court right focuses on procedure’s intrinsic value in 
respecting individual dignity. See Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the “Day in Court” Ideal 
and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 202–03, 264–79 (1992) (arguing that the 
Supreme Court’s broad right to a personal day in court, strictly applied, best fits a process-
oriented dignitary theory of participation). Second, insofar as the Mathews test is 
utilitarian, it is incompatible with participation as a right. See Jerry L. Mashaw, The 
Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. 
Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 47–49 
(1976) (arguing that the Mathews test is utilitarian). Third, and most importantly, the 
Mathews test does not fit the Supreme Court’s day-in-court jurisprudence. The Court has 
never invoked the Mathews balancing test to analyze due process challenges to nonparty 
preclusion; instead it relies on a supposed “deep-rooted historical tradition that everyone 
should have his own day in court.” Taylor, 553 U.S. at 892–93. Moreover, the Court 
recognizes an extremely broad day-in-court right that guarantees expansive individual 
control over litigation choices, a degree of control that exceeds anything the Mathews test 
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calling it an institutional right, I mean that the participation right is 
defined by the balance of considerations relevant to assuring that 
adjudication works fairly and justly for all litigants. The fact that the 
participation right functions as a right necessarily means that it 
excludes utilitarian reasons for limiting participation based on social 
welfare maximization. But the fact that it functions as an institutional 
right means that it tolerates limits that substantially further the 
institutional goals of adjudication. These include limits that make 
meaningful recovery possible for all claimants and even limits that 
reduce litigation costs when those costs are so high that they interfere 
with the effective functioning of the institution.193 
Sixth, any use of sampling must take account of Rules Enabling 
Act (“REA”) constraints. The REA authorizes the Supreme Court to 
make rules of practice and procedure, including the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.194 The REA includes a proviso that no Rule can 
“abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.”195 The impact of 
the REA proviso on the legitimacy of sampling is examined in Part 
IV.196 Here it is useful to focus on a particular sampling constraint that 
the Tyson Foods Court derives from the REA: sampling is 
permissible in a class action only when it is also permissible in an 
individual suit.197 
This is an unfortunate interpretation of the REA. It forces a 
judge contemplating the use of sampling in a class action to first 
justify its use in individual suits. This might not be too difficult if the 
same reasons apply to both class and individual litigation. But it 
makes no sense to require the extra step when sampling is 
appropriate precisely because cases are aggregated. The class action, 
 
would support. See id. at 898–901. As I argue in the text, the participation right is limited, 
but its limits do not derive from the Mathews balancing test. Rather, they derive from the 
fact that participation is an institutional right subject to institutional constraints that still 
respect its status as a right. 
 193. The right to jury trial must be considered as well. This is a complicated issue that I 
will not explore here. Whether sampling creates a jury trial issue depends on the sampling 
protocol. In particular, there is no problem if sampling is used to derive information about 
averages that is then presented to a jury, as in Tyson Foods. See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. 
Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1043–44 (2016). 
 194. 28 U.S.C. §	2072(a) (2012). 
 195. Id. §	2072(b). 
 196. See infra Section IV.B.2. 
 197. See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1048 (distinguishing Wal-Mart by arguing that the 
intra-class heterogeneity in Wal-Mart precluded use of sampling in individual suits and 
that because of that, “[p]ermitting the use of that sample in a class action	.	.	.	would have 
violated the Rules Enabling Act by giving plaintiffs and defendants different rights in a 
class proceeding than they could have asserted in an individual action”). 
95 N.C. L. REV. 607 (2017) 
654 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95 
for example, gathers all cases within a single court’s jurisdiction and 
thus makes it easier to draw a random sample.198 Also, the most 
compelling reasons to use sampling often focus on socially valuable 
aggregations and on sampling’s contribution in facilitating them. If 
the only sensible interpretation of the REA required the Tyson Foods 
limitation, then we would have to accept it as a misguided constraint 
imposed by Congress. But, as explained in Part IV, this limitation is 
not the only sensible interpretation. When sampling is used to remove 
obstacles to the efficient, fair, and just enforcement of substantive 
rights, it serves the same purposes as any other procedural rule, and 
there is no reason why the REA should bar it. 
IV.  THE LEGITIMACY PROBLEM 
The analysis in Part III showed that sampling, when properly 
designed, can be the best, and sometimes the only, way to enable 
private enforcement of the substantive law and assure fair and just 
outcomes for all injured parties. It also showed that concerns about 
heterogeneity and day-in-court participation rights, while relevant, do 
not prevent the use of sampling in many cases where it otherwise 
makes sense. Even so, it is likely that many readers will still have 
nagging doubts. For them, I suspect, a process of deciding cases by 
statistically extrapolating from a random sample just does not seem 
legitimate for adjudication. But it is not easy to explain why.199 
The following discussion first distinguishes between perceived 
legitimacy and normative legitimacy and argues that any convincing 
critique of statistical adjudication must be cast in normative terms. It 
then examines three normative arguments against the use of 
sampling. The first is that sampling is such a radical departure from 
ordinary adjudication that it risks jeopardizing the integrity of the 
institution. The second is that sampling’s effects make it too 
substantive to qualify as a legitimate procedural device suitable for 
use without legislative approval. The third focuses on the way 
 
 198. If individual suits were litigated separately, all the judges involved in the various 
lawsuits would have to know about the other pending cases, agree on the use of sampling, 
and coordinate its implementation. In addition, if sample cases are tried and the average 
(or other statistic) is used for all the rest, then the court might be required to have 
personal jurisdiction over the sampled plaintiffs and possibly venue over their suits as well. 
 199. There are other situations where intuitions about legitimacy are strong but not 
easy to justify. For example, I expect most people would think it illegitimate to conduct an 
election for President of the United States by randomly sampling the electorate and basing 
the outcome on the sample results—even if a reliable sampling procedure could be 
designed and sampling was much less expensive than allowing everyone to vote. 
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sampling alters the decision-making process: it substitutes a 
mechanical algorithm for case-specific reasoning. 
A. Normative Legitimacy Versus Perceived Legitimacy 
There are two different types of legitimacy: perceived legitimacy 
and normative legitimacy. Perceived legitimacy focuses on subjective 
perceptions of legitimacy and worries that the public might lose faith 
in the court system.200 Normative legitimacy focuses on whether the 
procedure in question is legitimate on normative grounds, 
independent of public perceptions.201 
There are several problems with using perceived legitimacy to 
critique statistical adjudication. First, it seems far-fetched to think 
that the public will lose faith in the court system if sampling is used 
selectively.202 In fact, the public might respond favorably if sampling 
speeds recovery and helps to compensate deserving victims. Second, 
public perceptions are circular. The more sampling is used, the more 
familiar the public will become with it and the more legitimate it will 
seem. Third, and most important, criticisms based on perceived 
legitimacy are often normative legitimacy critiques in disguise. A 
critic might believe that the particular practice is normatively 
illegitimate, assume that everyone else must share the same belief, 
and conclude that the public will reject the practice as illegitimate. By 
framing a normative intuition as an empirical claim about public 
perceptions, the critic never has to explain the theoretical basis for 
her intuition. For these reasons, any legitimacy critique of statistical 
adjudication should be framed in normative terms. 
B. Three Arguments from Normative Legitimacy 
This Section critically examines three possible critiques based on 
normative legitimacy: (1) that sampling is too strange a fit with 
adjudication, (2) that it is too substantive to qualify as procedure, and 
(3) that it is too mechanical to substitute for the ordinary judicial 
reasoning process. Before proceeding, however, it is important to 
address two other arguments that are often presented as legitimacy 
critiques. 
 
 200. See Bone, supra note 192, at 233–35. 
 201. Id. at 236. 
 202. For example, I am not aware of any evidence of public opposition to the limited 
use of bellwether trials and statistical adjudication today. 
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The first argument simply treats the negative effect on 
participation rights as a matter of institutional legitimacy, not just 
individual dignity.203 This argument fares no better cast in legitimacy 
terms than it does cast in dignity terms. All the same responses apply 
with equal force.204 
The second legitimacy argument invokes the dichotomy, 
common in procedure literature, between two models of litigation: 
the “traditional model” and the “public law model.”205 The traditional 
model supposes that the primary function of civil adjudication is to 
resolve private disputes.206 The public law model envisions the 
purpose of adjudication more broadly, as involving regulation and 
public-norm creation and enforcement.207 Relying on this dichotomy, 
a critic might argue that sampling is not legitimate because it departs 
too much from the traditional model. 
This argument, however, goes absolutely nowhere. Civil 
adjudication has never been merely about resolving private disputes. 
Insofar as it resolves disputes, it does so according to the substantive 
law.208 The purpose is to enforce substantive law rights, and the point 
of doing that is to promote the values the substantive law embodies. 
Thus, adjudication at its core is regulatory. Given this, a critic of 
sampling must explain why it is not legitimate to use sampling to 
improve substantive law enforcement. Put differently, the fact that 
sampling diverges from the traditional model means nothing because 
 
 203. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 135–37 (2009); 
Solum, supra note 189, at 279–80.  
 204. See supra notes 186–93 and accompanying text. 
 205. Professor Abram Chayes, in his famous 1976 article, posited two models of 
litigation: the traditional model and the public law model. See Abram Chayes, The Role of 
the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282–84 (1976). And others 
have framed a similar dichotomy using different terminology. See, e.g., Meir Dan-Cohen, 
Bureaucratic Organizations and the Theory of Adjudication, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1–7 
(1985) (highlighting differences between the “arbitration model” and the “regulation 
model”); Owen M. Fiss, The Social and Political Foundations of Adjudication, 6 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 121, 122–25 (1982) (parsing the “dispute resolution model” and the 
“structural reform” model); Kenneth E. Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN. 
L. REV. 937, 937–39 (1975) (distinguishing the “Conflict Resolution Model” and the 
“Behavior Modification Model”). 
 206. See, e.g., Chayes, supra note 205, at 1282–84. 
 207. See id. at 1282–84, 1302. 
 208. Indeed, this is why the system has motions to dismiss, broad discovery, extensive 
pretrial and trial procedures, and other elaborate features aimed at preventing strategic 
abuse and generating reasonably accurate outcomes. 
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the traditional model is not an accurate depiction of our litigation 
system.209 
1.  Sampling Is Too Strange 
Statistical adjudication, at first glance, seems quite foreign to civil 
adjudication, as it is customarily practiced. Courts do not decide cases 
by averaging over a sample; they engage the facts of each case and 
reason to the best decision based on those facts. Still, the oddity of 
sampling is not a problem in itself. The merger of law and equity must 
have seemed odd to mid-nineteenth century American judges and 
lawyers accustomed to a dual system, and the adoption of liberal 
pleading and broad discovery in the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure must have seemed strange to jurists at that time. Still, all 
these innovations were eventually accepted as established features of 
the litigation landscape.210 
The way to make sense of this criticism is to treat it as an 
argument based on a Burkean conservatism about institutions and the 
risks of radical reform.211 There is some wisdom in proceeding 
cautiously when altering an extremely complex institution like civil 
adjudication, especially an institution that has evolved over centuries. 
A reform that might seem sensible can produce unintended 
consequences that change the institution in irreversible ways. 
There are, however, two problems with this argument as a 
critique of sampling. First, sampling—and statistical decision making 
 
 209. For a more thorough discussion of the problems with the traditional/public-law 
dichotomy, see Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller’s Theory of Adjudication and the False 
Dichotomy Between Dispute Resolution and Public Law Models of Litigation, 75 B.U. L. 
REV. 1273, 1275–76 (1995). In addition to these two concerns, some people might worry 
that sampling introduces too much mathematics or smacks too much of law-and-
economics. But neither of these is a serious objection. In fact, the tools of mathematics and 
law-and-economics have much to offer procedure. Some people might worry that sampling 
will dehumanize the litigation process over the long run, but this is an unrealistic fear if 
judges use sampling selectively and only when it is well justified. 
 210. Pleading standards and broad discovery are targets of criticism, of course, but few 
argue that they are illegitimate. 
 211. One might frame this argument in terms of tradition, but then one must explain 
why tradition should be the touchstone of legitimacy. Indeed, if legitimacy required 
following traditional practices, much of contemporary civil procedure would have to be 
jettisoned, since much of it represents a major departure from traditional practices. See 
FED. R. CIV. P. 19, 24 advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment (describing the way 
that the 1966 reforms of Rules 19 and 24 departed from previous practice); Robert G. 
Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit Structure from 
the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 104–07 (1989) (describing how 
the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure altered traditional joinder rules).  
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more generally—are not all that strange to civil adjudication. In fact, 
as explained below, they are already well-entrenched features of 
adjudication, just not in obvious ways. Second, sampling is too 
sensible a tool to block its use on this ground. More generally, 
Burkean conservatism should not paralyze sensible reforms, 
especially reforms that target rapidly changing conditions. 
a. Sampling Is Not That Strange After All 
Sampling and decision making based on statistical averaging are 
not that strange in adjudication. When a lawmaker fashions a general 
rule of substantive law, she designs the rule with an eye to what is 
typical or average for the type of scenario she is trying to regulate.212 
Moreover, to determine what is typical, the lawmaker focuses on 
what she knows, which is necessarily a subset or sample of all the 
possible scenarios—past, present, and future. It follows that when the 
rule is applied to a particular case, the resulting decision is based 
indirectly on the lawmaker’s sample. 
Consider a simple example. Suppose lawmakers adopt a law that 
prohibits drivers from exceeding fifty miles per hour on a stretch of 
highway. This law is based, among other things, on predictions and 
statistics about the risk of accidents at different speeds. Those 
predictions, in turn, must average over a sample of driving 
experience. It follows that when a judge finds a defendant liable for 
driving sixty miles per hour, the judge engages in a kind of statistical 
adjudication. Driving sixty miles per hour might have been perfectly 
safe given the weather, traffic, and road conditions that the defendant 
faced at the time. But the defendant’s liability depends not on his own 
driving conditions, but instead on the average case that the rule was 
designed to target, which itself is based on a sample of driving 
experience. To be sure, whether the defendant exceeded fifty miles 
per hour is a case-specific determination, but whether the defendant’s 
speed was unsafe is not. This is, after all, how general rules work. 
Settlements also rely on sampling.213 Parties value their cases for 
settlement purposes based on results in similar cases. In particular, 
each side estimates the likelihood of trial success, the probable trial 
 
 212. See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 
DUKE L.J. 557 (1992) (discussing the difference between rules and standards).  
 213. This is particularly significant because only about two percent of filed civil cases 
are ever tried; most settle and the rest are dismissed or dropped. See Marc Galanter, The 
Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 
1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 459, 462–63 tbl.1 (2004). 
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award, and the costs of litigating by averaging over a sample of 
previous cases.214 Thus, if the case settles, the plaintiff receives an 
average recovery based on the sample, which is the same as she would 
receive through statistical adjudication.215 
Finally, jury verdicts are also based on assumptions about 
average behavior derived from experience. This is true no matter 
what view of jury decision-making one holds.216 In Bayesian theory, 
jurors use conditional probabilities to update their prior beliefs that a 
particular hypothesis is true (such as that the defendant was drunk 
while driving).217 Conditional probabilities are based on average 
expectations over a juror’s slice of real world experience.218 If jurors 
 
 214. See BONE, supra note 131, at 71–78 (describing the standard model of settlement). 
Suppose that defendant’s lawyer is aware of 100 similar cases that were tried previously. 
Suppose that 40 of these cases ended in plaintiff victories and 60 ended in defendant 
victories. Also, of the 40 plaintiff victories, 10 cases ended in trial verdicts of $200,000, 20 
cases in verdicts of $150,000, and 10 cases in verdicts of $100,000. Finally, in 50 of the 100 
cases, it cost defendants $25,000 to litigate the case through trial, and in the other 50, it 
cost only $15,000. Defendant’s lawyer should estimate a 40% chance of plaintiff 
winning at trial, which is the average of total past wins and losses: 40 
wins	÷	100	cases	=	40%. She should also estimate an expected trial verdict of $150,000, 
which is the average of all the verdict amounts in the 40 cases that plaintiffs won: 
[(10	×	200,000)	+	(20	×	150,000)	+	(10	×	100,000)] ÷	40	=	6,000,000	÷	40	=	$150,000. And she 
should estimate expected litigation costs of $20,000, the average of the litigation 
costs over the 100 cases: [(50	×	25,000)	+	(50	×	15,000)]	÷	100	=	$20,000. Thus, defendant’s 
lawyer will calculate an expected trial loss of (0.4	×	150,000)	+	20,000	=	$80,000. As a result, a 
risk-neutral defendant should be willing to pay up to $80,000 to settle the case. The 
important point to note here is that all these estimates are averages over a sample of 100 
cases. 
 215. Indeed, random sampling through statistical adjudication can produce a more 
accurate average value for claims than informal settlements distorted by informational 
asymmetries. One might wonder about the propriety of comparing sampling for trial with 
settlement, but it is a perfectly sensible comparison. Settlements are outcomes of the 
litigation process just as much as trial judgments are. As such, settlements must be 
evaluated by the same substantive law metric that applies to trial judgments. It is true that 
settlements are supported by consent, but parties can also consent to statistical 
adjudication. To be sure, consent to statistical adjudication usually comes from the 
attorney and is susceptible to agency problems, but agency problems also infect 
settlements. Because unsophisticated clients depend on their attorneys for advice, an 
attorney can nudge the client towards a settlement that serves the attorney’s interests 
more than the client’s. In addition, consent to a settlement is normatively problematic 
when the litigation alternative is infected by high delay or transaction costs. My point is 
only that consent does not mark a clear distinction between settlements and sampling. 
 216. See generally Michael S. Pardo, The Nature and Purpose of Evidence Theory, 66 
VAND. L. REV. 547 (2013) (describing two alternative conceptions of evidence and 
proof—probabilistic versus explanatory). 
 217. For a brief description of Bayesian theory, see id. at 575 n.112. 
 218. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Problematic Value of 
Mathematical Models of Evidence, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 107, 108 (2007). More precisely, 
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instead engage in a more holistic process of “inference to the best 
explanation,” each juror will assess the “relative plausibility of the 
competing hypotheses advanced by the parties”219 by comparing these 
hypotheses to her own “stories, scripts, and scenarios.”220 Those 
stores, scripts, and scenarios are composites of a juror’s experience, 
which is just an informal sample of reality. Moreover, the most salient 
stories, scripts, and scenarios are likely to homogenize or average 
over that informal sample.221 
 
jurors are assumed to rely on a likelihood ratio, which is the ratio of the probability of 
discovering and receiving particular evidence if the hypothesis is true divided by the 
probability of discovering and receiving the same evidence if some other hypothesis is 
true. See Pardo, supra note 216, at 575 n.112. In these models of evidentiary inference, the 
likelihood ratio measures the probative value of the evidence. See Allen & Pardo, supra, 
at 108. Bayes’s Theorem gives a way to update one’s assessment of the probability a 
hypothesis is true by combining one’s prior probability with the likelihood ratio for a 
particular piece of evidence.  
 219. Allen & Pardo, supra note 218, at 136. 
 220. See Ronald J. Allen, Factual Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence, 88 NW. U. L. 
REV. 604, 629 (1994); Michael S. Pardo & Ronald J. Allen, Juridical Proof and the Best 
Explanation, 27 LAW & PHIL. 223, 234–35 (2008). Professor Allen describes the process 
this way: 
[W]e carry around stories, scripts, and scenarios, all more or less robust and all 
subject to modification in a virtually infinite variety of ways. “Evidence” in the 
human brain is embedded in these contexts, although fluidly in a way that permits 
constant cycling back and forth between the data, new and old, and their stories. It 
is into this bubbling cauldron that the trial “evidence” must enter, and its effect is 
determined by the interaction of the data with the prior knowledge stored in the 
related chunks constituting stories. Trial observations instantiate these stories and 
work modifications of them. This, of course, merely reemphasizes the dynamic 
nature of evidence and highlights that the data at trial that the conventional theory 
refers to as evidence is merely the means by which the preexisting stories and 
scenarios of factfinders are put into play, as it were, in order to fashion an estimate 
of what actually happened.	.	.	.	The structure of proof requires selection over the 
stories advanced at trial, and for data to be coherent it must be embedded, or be 
able to be embedded, in stories highly analogous if not identical to the stories 
being advanced by the parties as their claims about what happened. 
Allen, supra, at 629–30. It is worth mentioning that inference to the best explanation is not 
logically inconsistent with Bayesian updating, but the type of Bayesian updating that 
would be required is far too complex to make it feasible. Id. at 607. 
 221. Of course, not all evidence is equally vulnerable to this averaging process. Direct 
evidence, for example, can provide very strong support for the ultimate fact. But even 
direct evidence must be evaluated for credibility and reliability, which involves a juror’s 
experience and her stories, scripts, and scenarios. In the Tyson Foods case, for example, a 
video showing donning and doffing by a specific employee or an average for that 
employee over multiple donning and doffing activities would be extremely strong evidence 
of donning and doffing times for that employee. Yet jurors must still assess the evidence in 
light of the possibility that the data is defective or the sampling methodology flawed, and 
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Thus, while we tend to think of adjudication as providing an 
individualized outcome for each particular case, adjudicative 
outcomes, to a large extent, average over samples of similar cases. 
This means that we should revisit our initial reaction to sampling. To 
be sure, it is unusual for a judge to decide a case by relying directly on 
a statistic derived from a sample. But it is not clear that it is 
sufficiently unusual to justify rejecting the procedure outright. 
b. The Value of Sensible Reform 
The litigation system as we know it today took shape through 
active reform efforts that responded to changing economic, social, 
political, and intellectual conditions.222 The same is true for statistical 
adjudication. It too responds to changing conditions—in this case, the 
creation of new causes of action, the advent of mass harms, 
improvements in technology, and so on. Reforms like these are 
particularly useful when change is too rapid for the gradual process of 
institutional evolution to respond effectively. 
Still, it is important to guard against overconfidence and 
excessive reform zeal. There are risks to altering any complex system, 
and one must account for the risks in advance whenever possible. 
Moreover, institutions have core elements that are essential to their 
proper functioning, and one must be careful not to jeopardize those 
elements. Below I argue that one such element for civil adjudication, 
perhaps the most important, is the reasoning process judges use to 
decide cases. But I also argue that statistical adjudication does not 
endanger that process as long as it is used properly. In the end, 
sampling is too sensible and useful a tool in the current world of 
litigation for a Burkean concern to prevent its use. 
2.  Sampling Is Too Substantive 
One might worry that sampling should be implemented as 
substantive law, not as procedure, because of its outcome effects. The 
concern is the same as the one discussed above: sampling 
systematically and predictably skews individual recoveries away from 
substantive entitlements. This aspect raises potential problems under 
the Rules Enabling Act (“REA”), with its proviso that court-made 
 
to do that, each juror must apply his or her experience—stories, scripts, and scenarios—to 
assess competing expert testimony. 
 222. See Bone, supra note 211, at 9–12, 78–80 (discussing the reform efforts that led to 
the field code and those that led to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).  
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rules must not “abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right”223 
and also implicates separation-of-powers concerns more generally. 
The argument is that if sampling alters substantive rights by skewing 
outcomes, it can be used legitimately only when it is authorized by 
substantive rules made in the usual way substantive law is made.224 
This is the concern that animated the Wal-Mart Court’s rejection 
of statistical adjudication for backpay awards.225 While a bit opaque, 
the Court’s argument is fairly easy to understand. Because the Ninth 
Circuit’s proposed sampling procedure would have afforded relief to 
some class members who had no right to it (because Wal-Mart had a 
good defense that it was not allowed to litigate), that procedure 
“enlarged” the substantive rights of those class members in violation 
of the REA.226 The problem is that this reading of the REA threatens 
all forms of statistical adjudication. At its core, statistical adjudication 
depends on sampling, and sampling works by cutting off the 
individual litigation of rights and defenses for cases that are not part 
of the sample. To be sure, the REA applies only to those procedural 
rules, like the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, enacted pursuant to 
the formal court rulemaking process.227 But separation-of-powers 
principles extend more broadly and create similar issues for sampling 
implemented through judge-made common law. 
Fortunately for the future of statistical adjudication, Wal-Mart’s 
interpretation of the REA is not the Court’s last word on the subject. 
Tyson Foods reads Wal-Mart narrowly to create some room for 
sampling.228 According to the Tyson Foods Court, sampling is 
 
 223. 28 U.S.C. §	2072(b) (2012); see supra notes 194–95 and accompanying text. 
 224. See, e.g., In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1016, 1023 (5th Cir. 1997) (Jones, J., 
concurring) (observing that “there is a fine line between deriving results from trials based 
on statistical sampling and pure legislation” and that the court is “not authorized by the 
Constitution or statutes to legislate solutions to cases in pursuit of efficiency and 
expeditiousness”); cf. In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 712 (5th Cir. 1990) (“We are 
told	.	.	.	that the difficulties faced by the courts as well as the rights of the class members to 
have their cases tried cry powerfully for innovation and judicial creativity. The arguments 
are compelling, but they are better addressed to the representative branches—Congress 
and the State Legislature.”). 
 225. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 367 (2011). 
 226. See id. Although the Court referred to the defendant’s “right to litigate” defenses, 
it seems unlikely that the Court meant to focus on the process of litigating. It is much more 
likely that the Court meant to focus on the outcome of litigating when the defendant is 
unable to present its defenses. 
 227. 28 U.S.C. §	2072.  
 228. See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1048 (2016). The Tyson 
Foods Court’s reading of Wal-Mart is highly questionable. It supposes that the Wal-Mart 
Court used the likely result in an individual suit as the REA baseline. See id. However, a 
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permitted in a class action if—and only if—it is also permitted in 
individual suits.229 As discussed above, this limitation is undesirable as 
a policy matter because it excludes cases where sampling makes sense 
only in an aggregation.230 Moreover, the limitation is not compelled 
by the REA, and it does not even fit the best interpretation of that 
statute.231 The best interpretation of the REA proviso, as well as 
separation-of-powers limitations, should permit a properly designed 
sampling procedure when it is needed to enforce the substantive law 
properly. When this is so, sampling serves procedural goals: it assures 
 
better interpretation of Wal-Mart is that the Court compared the skewed outcomes from 
sampling directly to the parties’ substantive law rights. On this interpretation, sampling 
might well offend the REA or separation-of-powers principles even if it were used in 
individual suits, again because it systematically skews outcomes away from substantive 
entitlements. 
 229. Id. at 1046 (holding that the permissibility of sampling in an individual suit is both 
necessary and sufficient for its use in a class action). 
 230. See supra note 198 and accompanying text. In fact, the Court’s argument begs the 
central question: why sampling does not violate the REA or separation-of-powers 
principles when it is used in an individual suit? Neither Tyson Foods nor Mt. Clemens 
addresses this question. I argue in the text that sampling does not violate the REA or 
offend separation-of-powers principles, and the reason applies equally to class actions and 
individual suits. 
 231. The Supreme Court has never articulated a coherent doctrinal framework for 
applying the REA proviso. Early on, the Court adopted a test that asked whether the 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure “really regulates procedure,—the judicial process for 
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering 
remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.” Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 
312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941); see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464 (1965) (relying on the 
same test). The Court, however, did not explain how “really” regulating procedure differs 
from just regulating it. See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14. In 2010, a plurality of the Court 
endorsed a version of this test focusing on whether the rule on its face regulates a matter 
of procedure, regardless of its substantive effects. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. 
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 406–10 (2010) (plurality opinion) (upholding the validity 
of Rule 23 against a challenge that it enlarged the substantive rights created by state law 
and embodied in the state claim). And in 1987, the Court made clear that “incidental” 
substantive effects would not invalidate a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, especially if the 
rule was “reasonably necessary to maintain the integrity of [the] system of rules[,]” and 
also recognized a strong presumption in favor of the validity of a Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure based on the careful review that those rules receive during the rulemaking 
process. Burlington N.R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5, 8 (1987). One might argue that 
Rule 23 with sampling really regulates procedure because it has a procedural purpose and 
that its substantive effects are merely incidental. However, one might also argue that 
sampling converts Rule 23 into more than a joinder device by injecting a substantive 
dimension and that its substantive effects are more than incidental. It is difficult to resolve 
this controversy without a clearer understanding of when a Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure actually regulates procedure on its face and what constitutes an incidental 
effect. 
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that individuals with meritorious claims can obtain a fair and just 
determination of their claims.232 
It is true that sampling affects outcomes in predictable and 
systematic ways, but so do many other procedures. For example, 
tightening a pleading standard predictably and systematically 
increases the error risk for plaintiffs with meritorious suits and 
reduces the error risk for defendants.233 And relaxing the pleading 
standard, as notice pleading does, has predictable and systematic 
effects in the opposite direction. It follows that outcome effects, even 
predictable and systematic effects, alone cannot be enough to trigger 
the REA or separation-of-powers concerns. As long as sampling 
serves procedural goals—such as distributing the risk of error more 
fairly and efficiently or reducing process costs—and as long as there is 
no legislative bar to its use,234 its substantive effects are merely 
“incidental” and sampling does not intrude on the legislative 
sphere.235 
 
 232. See Sergio J. Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1059, 1118–
21 (2012); see also Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, 
Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 950–54 (1999) 
(proposing a test to measure validity based on the rule’s justification); Tobias Barrington 
Wolff, Managerial Judging and Substantive Law, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1027, 1046–47 
(2013) (arguing that the Wal-Mart Court should have considered the question whether 
sampling was justified as an exercise of federal common law power to provide remedies 
adequate to further Title VII policies).  
 233. See Bone, supra note 175, at 925–28. 
 234. If the best interpretation of the federal statute creating the substantive claim 
clearly required case-specific determinations incompatible with the use of sampling, then 
sampling would alter substantive rights and violate the REA and separation-of-powers 
principles. 
 235. See Burlington N.R.R. Co., 480 U.S. at 5 (holding that “incidental” effects on 
substantive rights do not trigger the REA proviso). My discussion ignores potential 
Article III concerns. The Tyson Foods Court did not decide whether Article III’s case or 
controversy requirement prevents a class action from being certified when it includes class 
members with no legal injury or when those class members cannot be identified and 
excluded from sharing in the class recovery. See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. 
Ct. 1036, 1049–50 (2016); see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547–48 (2016) 
(holding that the named representative of a class seeking statutory damages must allege 
concrete injury for Article III standing but stating nothing about whether absent class 
members must also satisfy standing requirements). This Article III issue is not strictly 
about sampling; it is about the permissibility of aggregations that include uninjured 
individuals who would have no Article III standing to bring individual suits. Compare 
Neale v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC, 794 F.3d 353, 364 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding that only 
the named representative needs Article III standing), with Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 
443 F.3d 253, 264 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that Article III applies to all class members). In 
any case, if Article III bars certification of class actions that predictably include uninjured 
class members, then it also bars sampling whether it is used in a class action or an 
individual suit. 
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One might argue that sampling is too substantive for a different 
reason, namely, that it is likely to be politically controversial and 
therefore should be vetted through the political process.236 But this 
objection goes too far. Taken seriously, it would cripple the court 
rulemaking process. For example, Rule 23 would violate the REA 
proviso viewed in this way, as would the Federal Rules dealing with 
pleading, discovery, and summary judgment, all of which attract 
intense political controversy these days. The result—that virtually all 
procedural law in federal court would have to be adopted by 
Congress—is not only undesirable as a policy matter, but is also 
plainly inconsistent with the congressional decision in the REA to 
delegate the bulk of procedural rulemaking to the Supreme Court.237 
3.  Sampling Is Too Mechanical 
Statistical adjudication substitutes a mechanical and formulaic 
decision-making protocol for case-specific reasoning. The judge 
calculates the average (or other statistic) based on the sample results 
and applies it to all other cases in the aggregation. It is true that the 
judge employs a reasoning process when she decides whether to 
sample. Also, the sampled cases are decided in the usual way, by 
applying reason to the facts in light of the relevant law. But the rest of 
the aggregation is adjudicated mechanically without applying reason 
to the facts of each case. 
I believe this observation captures something important about 
adjudication, but we need to be clear about what exactly that is. To 
unpack the intuition, consider a hypothetical in which a judge flips a 
coin to decide an issue. Suppose that the issue is committed entirely 
to the judge’s discretion, such as the length of a sentence in a criminal 
case within the bounds of sentencing guidelines. After hearing 
extensive discussion, the judge comes to the conclusion that neither 
side has a more compelling argument. As a result, she proposes to flip 
a coin. Even if all the parties agree and there are no substantial third 
party effects, I believe that many, perhaps most, people would 
 
 236. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling 
Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 281, 308 (noting that a rule does not “abridge, enlarge, or modify” 
substantive rights if it is so general that it does not evoke political controversy). 
 237. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 
1015, 1106–12 (1982) (arguing that the principal purpose of the REA proviso was to 
allocate power between Congress and the Court).  
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condemn the judge for deciding the issue in this way.238 When pressed 
for an explanation, critics are likely to argue that flipping a coin is not 
a legitimate way for a judge to decide, that judges are supposed to 
employ reason and not rely on chance. 
Notice that the problem is not arbitrariness: the judge in our 
hypothetical has a sound justification for using a coin flip.239 From an 
outcome perspective, the coin flip gives each side an equal chance, 
which is about as much as parties can expect when a case is in 
equipoise and there is no burden assignment rule to break ties. 
Moreover, flipping a coin has the advantage of purging the decision of 
any possible bias. 
The reason that the coin flip is unacceptable, I believe, is not that 
it produces an arbitrary result, but rather that it displaces the usual 
case-specific reasoning process at the point of decision.240 One of 
adjudication’s core elements, perhaps its most important, is its 
commitment to reasoning from general principle in a way that 
engages the facts of particular cases.241 More specifically, judges 
interpret the law as they apply it by placing existing legal norms 
alongside the facts of a case. This is a fancy way of describing 
something very familiar to lawyers: common law reasoning. In the 
common law system, even clear and seemingly categorical rules are 
linked to and conditioned on general principles and the facts of 
 
 238. See, e.g., LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(Kozinski, J., concurring) (noting that he would refuse to enforce an arbitration clause 
that “provided that the district judge would review the [arbitration award] by flipping a 
coin”) overruled by Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987 
(9th Cir. 2003); In re Brown, 662 N.W.2d 733, 734, 736 (Mich. 2003) (accepting the 
recommendation that a judge be censured for flipping a coin when neither side’s argument 
was more persuasive); Adam M. Samaha, Randomization in Adjudication, 51 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1, 28–29, 28 nn.105–06 (2009) (providing several examples of judges being 
sanctioned for flipping a coin to decide a case). 
 239. See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Just Lotteries, 27 SOC. SCI. INFO. 
483, 495–505 (1988) (discussing equal entitlement and scarcity conditions for using the 
lottery as an exclusive or nonexclusive method of allocation and noting that using the 
lottery under these conditions is supported by reason).  
 240. See Shay Lavie, Note, Reverse Sampling: Holding Lotteries to Allocate the 
Proceeds of Small-Claims Class Actions, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1065, 1084–85 (2011) 
(“The public has every right to expect that a jurist will carefully weigh the matters at issue 
and	.	.	.	render reasoned rulings and decisions.” (quoting N.Y. STATE COMM’N ON 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT, 1984 ANNUAL REPORT 88)); see also JON ELSTER, SOLOMONIC 
JUDGEMENTS: STUDIES IN THE LIMITATIONS OF RATIONALITY 38 (1989) (emphasizing 
that “the use of lotteries to resolve decision problems under uncertainty presupposes an 
unusual willingness to admit the insufficiency of reason”). 
 241. Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through Party 
Choice, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1387–91 (2012) (defending this point). 
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previous cases in a way that gives them a more or less flexible 
quality.242 A judge must decide how strictly to apply an established 
rule to a particular case—whether to modify the rule or carve out 
exceptions—by considering predictability, consistency, and other 
rule-of-law values.243 The same is true for constitutional law, which 
develops in a way rather similar to the common law process. And 
even statutory rules require interpretation to determine whether they 
apply to the case at hand and what they require on the particular 
facts. 
One way to describe this process is in terms of reflective 
equilibrium.244 The judge moves back and forth between her best 
understanding of the law including the principles and policies that 
support it, and the moral and practical intuitions generated by 
engaging the facts of the case, all the while adjusting law and intuition 
until they fit together in a reflective equilibrium.245 My claim then is 
that this reasoning process is a core, perhaps the core, feature of 
adjudication. It is essential to the integrity of the institution, and it is 
what distinguishes adjudication from arbitration, legislation, and 
other modes of dispute resolution and lawmaking. 
This claim is not essentialist; it does not assume a natural law 
ideal for adjudication. It focuses on civil adjudication as that process 
is actually practiced in the United States. All it assumes is that the 
institution has evolved to perform certain functions, such as deciding 
claims of right, regulating society, and making common law, and that 
it developed features along the way to help it serve those functions 
well. Thus, the claim is about our system of civil adjudication properly 
 
 242. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 225–75 (1986) [hereinafter 
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE]; RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 71–80, 
110–23, 340–41 (1978); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. 
REV. 353, 372–81 (1978).  
 243. Scholars disagree about these matters. Compare DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra 
note 242, at 264–66 (noting that judges should sometimes apply rules strictly but always 
subject to the demands of principled integrity), with FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY 
THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN 
LAW AND IN LIFE 196–206 (1991) (arguing for a strong presumption in favor of strict 
application).  
 244. On the method of reflective equilibrium, see generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY 
OF JUSTICE 42–45 (rev. ed. 1999).  
 245. See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 242, at 225–27 (describing a process of 
legal reasoning grounded in an effort to form “the best constructive interpretation of the 
community’s legal practice”); RAWLS, supra note 244, at 17–19 (describing the process of 
seeking a reflective equilibrium).  
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understood. More precisely, it is about the best normative 
understanding of that institution. 
Indeed, it is quite common to view adjudication as linked to a 
special type of reasoning process that combines general principles 
with case-specific facts.246 If this reasoning process is essential to what 
adjudication does—and I believe it is—then we should worry when a 
procedure threatens a court’s ability to engage in the process 
effectively. Deciding a case by flipping a coin falls into this category, 
as does choosing to have a judge decide a case by reading the entrails 
of a chicken or empaneling a jury of twelve orangutans.247 These 
methods of decision would be rejected as illegitimate despite the 
parties’ agreement, not just because they are bizarre but because they 
rob the judge of the ability to apply reason to the legally relevant 
facts. 
Although the question of legitimacy is more difficult for 
sampling, there are some easy cases. The use of sampling to 
determine facts does not interfere with the reflective equilibrium 
process in any significant way. Tyson Foods is a good example. In that 
case, sampling was used to determine how long employees took to 
don and doff their protective equipment. This is as close to a pure fact 
as one can get. To be sure, facts are inputs into the reasoning process, 
but innovative methods for finding facts do not trump or distort that 
process; they just affect the result. Moreover, the relevant FLSA law 
in Tyson Foods was clear and the method of determining liability 
fairly mechanical—add donning and doffing time to gang-time and 
subtract K-code time.248 So, there was not much cause to insist on 
case-specific reflective-equilibrium reasoning. 
 
 246. See, e.g., DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 242, at 225–27, 245–47, 254–58; 
Fuller, supra note 242, at 364, 366 (noting that “[a]djudication is	.	.	.	a device which gives 
formal and institutional expression to the influence of reasoned argument in human 
affairs” and that “the distinguishing characteristic of adjudication lies in the fact that it 
confers on the affected party a peculiar form of participation	.	.	.	that of presenting proofs 
and reasoned arguments for a decision in his favor”). 
 247. See LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(Kozinski, J., concurring) (noting that he would refuse to enforce an arbitration clause 
that “provided that the district judge would review the [arbitration award] by	.	.	.	studying 
the entrails of a dead fowl”) overruled by Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., 
Inc., 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Josefik, 753 F.2d 585, 588 (7th Cir. 
1985) (noting that an agreement to trial by twelve orangutans would be invalid). 
 248. See supra notes 43–46 and accompanying text. Moreover, in a jury trial case, 
factual determinations are for the jury to decide and we do not expect jurors to engage in 
a process of reflective equilibrium. To be sure, some jury questions, such as whether the 
defendant was negligent, involve the application of law to fact, but we assume that the 
judge first decides the applicable law and then instructs the jury what law to apply. I 
 
95 N.C. L. REV. 607 (2017) 
2017] STATISTICAL ADJUDICATION 669 
Beyond the easy cases, the legitimacy analysis gets murkier. But 
there are some reasonably clear points. First, it is not necessary that 
every individual case be decided by a process of reflective 
equilibrium. If it were, the class action would not be legitimate. Nor 
would it be legitimate to decide a common question of law and fact 
separate from the specific facts of individual cases that give it texture 
and context. 
Second, mixed questions of law and fact can be appropriate for 
sampling. For example, courts are comfortable using approximation 
methods, including sampling, to estimate damages even though the 
estimation process can involve the application of law to fact.249 After 
the Wal-Mart decision, for example, some courts continued to use 
sampling to calculate damages, distinguishing Wal-Mart as a case 
involving sampling for liability.250 
These two points go a long way to support the legitimacy of 
sampling for liability as well as for damages. Sampling preserves the 
reflective-equilibrium reasoning process for the sampled cases, which 
is significant because not all cases need be decided in the 
conventional way. Moreover, the fact that the liability issues involve 
 
ignore the judge-jury distinction in the text and assume that the judge is deciding the issue 
that is subject to sampling. 
 249. It is well settled, especially when the plaintiff faces evidentiary or other practical 
obstacles to proof, that she need not provide a precise measure of damages; it is enough if 
the plaintiff proposes a method that permits a “	‘just and reasonable inference’	.	.	.	even 
though the result is only an approximation.” Cristallina S.A. v. Christie, Manson & Woods 
Int’l, Inc., 502 N.Y.S.2d 165, 173 (App. Div. 1986) (quoting Story Parchment Co. v. 
Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931)); see Pulaski & Middleman, LLC 
v. Google, Inc., 802 F.3d 979, 989 (9th Cir. 2015) (“In calculating damages, here 
restitution, California law ‘requires only that some reasonable basis of computation of 
damages be used, and the damages may be computed even if the result reached is an 
approximation.’	” (quoting Marsu, B.V. v. Walt Disney Co., 185 F.3d 932, 938–39 (9th Cir. 
1999)), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2410 (2016) (mem.); Sw. Stainless, LP v. Sappington, 582 
F.3d 1176, 1186 (10th Cir. 2009) (noting that “[w]hile the amount of lost profits ‘may not 
be based on mere speculation, conjecture and surmise alone, the mere uncertainty as to 
the exact amount of damages will not preclude the right of recovery. It is sufficient if the 
evidence shows the extent of damage by just and reasonable inference.’	” (quoting 
Florafax Int’l, Inc. v. GTE Mkt. Res., Inc., 933 P.2d 282, 296 (Okla. 1997))). And as Tyson 
Foods confirms, statistical sampling can be part of any such method. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. 
Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1047 (2016); see also 15 U.S.C. §	15d (2012) (allowing 
damages to “be proved and assessed in the aggregate by statistical or sampling methods” 
in a parens patriae price-fixing case once the defendant has been found liable for a price-
fixing agreement).  
 250. See, e.g., In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 768 F.3d 1245, 1256–57 (10th Cir. 2014) 
(distinguishing Wal-Mart on the ground that the sampling in that case would have decided 
liability issues and noting that “Wal-Mart does not prohibit certification based on the use 
of extrapolation to calculate damages”). 
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the application of law to fact is not in itself disqualifying. Judges 
decide common questions independent of case-specific facts today, 
and sampling is used to determine damages even when the inquiry 
involves law applied to fact. 
There is a third important point. Legitimacy cannot be just a 
function of the decision-making method. Outcome quality matters, 
too. In the extreme coin flip, chicken entrails, and orangutan 
examples above, the adverse effect on adjudicative reasoning was 
clear, direct, and serious, and there was no particular reason to use 
the procedure other than to satisfy party preferences. By contrast, 
sampling preserves the reasoning process in the sampled cases and 
furthers the purposes of adjudication by improving efficiency and 
making outcomes more fair and just for all parties. 
These considerations also impose significant limits on the use of 
sampling. Judges cannot just aggregate any set of related cases and 
decide them all by sampling a few. Not only must the aggregation be 
sufficiently homogeneous, but there must be a sound justification for 
sampling from it, a justification that meets rights-based as well as 
utilitarian constraints. And the sampling procedure must not sacrifice 
the usual process of adjudicative reasoning for too many cases.251 
Finally, while it is not essential for legitimacy, it might be wise, 
insofar as possible, to have sampled cases decided by different courts. 
Doing so has the advantage of harvesting a range of views on the 
issues being decided.252 In addition, the decisions in each sampled case 
should have precedential force in future cases to the extent decisions 
ordinarily do. These measures would ensure that the sampled cases 
are treated not just as samples for extrapolation purposes, but also as 
ordinary cases contributing to the adjudicative process in the usual 
way. 
 
 251. For example, suppose that judges in some state choose to routinely decide 
negligence cases by sampling. These judges wait until enough automobile accident, 
medical malpractice, or other negligence cases are filed and then sample from all the filed 
cases, giving the rest the average of the sample verdicts. There are many different reasons 
to object to this procedure, including concerns about population heterogeneity, the 
magnitude of social benefits, the treatment of rights, and legitimacy. And from a 
legitimacy perspective, it is significant that deciding cases in this way jettisons case-specific 
reasoning in a huge swath of cases without any special justification for doing so. 
 252. The district court conducting the sampling would have to have authority to 
transfer sampled cases to other courts, which might require legislation similar to the 
Multidistrict Litigation Act. See 28 U.S.C. §	1407 (2012). 
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CONCLUSION 
There is reason to celebrate the Tyson Foods decision and to 
read it broadly. Statistical adjudication through sampling can be a 
very useful procedural tool. Like summary judgment, case 
management, and other procedures, it helps assure that adjudication 
accomplishes its goals in the best possible way. Sampling must be 
used properly, and this Article develops a set of factors to guide 
decisions about whether and how to use it. These factors take account 
of what the Tyson Foods Court says and what it does in light of the 
broader purposes of civil adjudication. 
Still, many are likely to balk at the idea that courts can decide 
cases by extrapolating from a sample. Even the Tyson Foods Court 
refuses to acknowledge that the case is one of statistical adjudication, 
choosing instead to pretend that it is merely a case of statistical 
evidence. I argued that these reservations have to do with nagging 
doubts about the legitimacy of the procedure. I then examined three 
legitimacy objections: that statistical adjudication is too strange, that 
it is too substantive, and that it is too mechanical. None of these 
objections is decisive. When used properly, statistical adjudication 
through sampling neither transgresses the legitimate bounds of civil 
adjudication, nor violates the substantive or procedural rights of 
parties. It is past time that we embrace statistical adjudication without 
skepticism or hostility. Tyson Foods opens the door. It is up to us to 
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